晋升激励、资源错配与经济高质量发展——基于新旧考核模式差异化视角

Promotion Incentives,Resource Mismatch,and High-Quality Economic Development:Based on the Perspective of Differentiation between Old and New Appraisal Models

基于“晋升锦标赛”治理模式的特征事实,使用2003—2016年287个地级及以上城市面板数据,实证考察新旧考核模式下晋升激励对经济高质量发展的差异化影响。结果表明:(1)传统考核观下晋升激励显著阻碍了经济高质量发展,资源错配是晋升激励阻碍经济高质量发展的重要原因。(2)在资源丰富程度较低、政府财政透明度较低、年轻官员主政的城市以及直辖市中,晋升激励对经济高质量发展的负面影响更大;晋升激励对政绩存在“可视性偏差”。(3)新型考核观下晋升激励缓解了资源错配问题,促进了城市经济高质量发展,具有差异化空间溢出的特点。

Based on the characteristics of the“promotion tournament”governance model,this paper uses panel data from 287 cities at the prefecture level and above from 2003 to 2016 to empirically examine the differential impact of promotion incentives on high-quality economic development under the old and new models of assessment.The results show that under the traditional assessment,promotion incentives significantly hinder high-quality economic development,with resource misallocation being an important reason for this obstruction.The negative impact is more pronounced in cities with low resource abundance,low levels of government fiscal transparency,young leadership,and municipalities directly under the central government.Additionally,promotion incentives exhibit a“visibility bias”in performance.Under the new assessment perspective,promotion incentives alleviate the problem of resource misallocation,promote high-quality economic development in cities,and display characteristics of differentiated spatial spillover.