机构投资者分心与高管机会主义减持

Institutional Investor Distraction and Opportunistic Stock Selling Behaviors of Executives

文章以投资组合中不相关行业发生的极端收益为冲击,考察机构投资者因注意力分配差异而产生的分心现象对高管机会主义减持的影响。研究发现,高管在机构投资者因分心而弱化监督时会实施更多的机会主义减持行为。作用机制分析发现,机构投资者分心通过降低股价信息含量,从而加剧了高管机会主义减持行为。异质性分析发现,完善的公司内外部治理环境、国有企业性质、减持成本以及高管激励能够发挥一定程度的监督作用,抑制了机构投资者分心背景下高管机会主义减持动机。进一步研究发现,机构投资者的分心效应具有较长的持续性,机构投资者自身监督水平越高,其分心程度对高管机会主义减持影响越大,高管越能够在机会主义减持中获取更大的超额收益或规避更多的财富损失。文章不仅丰富了机构投资者分心的经济后果,为研究机构投资者治理效应提供了新的思路,也为监管部门强化对高管机会主义减持监管提供了重要启示。

This paper examines the impact of institutional investor distraction on opportunistic stock selling behaviors of executives,using extreme profit shocks in unrelated industries within their portfolios as shocks.The study finds that executives are more likely to engage in opportunistic stock selling when institutional investors weaken their oversight due to distraction.The mechanism at play reveals that institutional investor distraction exacerbates executive opportunistic stock selling by reducing stock price informativeness.Heterogeneous analysis reveals that a well-functioning corporate governance environment,state-owned enterprise status,selling cost,and executive incentives can exert supervisory effects and mitigate executive opportunistic stock selling in the context of institutional investor distraction.Further research reveals the prolonged effect of institutional investor distraction,with a higher level of institutional investor self-monitoring intensifying the impact of distraction on executive opportunistic stock sales,allowing executives to gain greater excess returns or avoid more wealth losses in opportunistic stock selling.This article not only enriches the economic consequences of institutional investor distraction,providing new insights for researching the governance effects of institutional investors but also offers important insights for regulatory authorities to strengthen the oversight of executive opportunistic divestments.