投服中心行权会影响企业劳动投资效率吗?——来自中国上市公司的经验证据

Does China Securities Investor Services Center's Shareholding Exercise Affect Labor Investment Efficiency of Enterprises?—Evidence from Chinese Listed Companies

中证中小投资者服务中心(以下简称“投服中心”)推出的持股行权政策是资本市场的重要制度创新,为解决中小投资者保护难题提供了政策思路。基于2014—2020年中国A股上市公司数据,构建多期双重差分模型检验了投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的影响。研究发现,投服中心行权能够显著提升企业劳动投资效率。机制检验结果显示,投服中心行权通过降低信息不对称和缓解代理问题进而提升企业劳动投资效率。异质性分析结果表明,在劳动投资不足、治理水平较低的企业中,以及行权方式为专项行动、股东大会和网上行权时,投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的提升效应显著。进一步研究发现,投服中心行权通过提升劳动投资效率,提高了企业业绩和企业价值。因此,应充分发挥投服中心行权对企业劳动投资效率的提升作用,提高公司治理水平,以保护中小投资者合法权益。

The shareholding exercise policy of the China Securities Investor Services Center(CSISC)is an important institutional innovation in the capital market,which provides policy strategy to protect small and medium investors.Based on the data of China s A-share listed companies from 2014 to 2020,this paper constructs a multi-period DID model to study the impact of the CSISC's shareholding exercise on labor investment efficiency of enterprises.This paper finds that the CSISC's shareholding exercise can significantly improve labor investment efficiency.The mechanism analysis shows that the CSISC's shareholding exercise mainly improves labor investment efficiency of enterprises by reducing information asymmetry and alleviating agency problems.The heterogeneity analysis shows that the promotion effect of the CSISC's shareholding exercise on labor investment efficiency is more significant in enterprises with low labor investment and poor corporate governance and when the CSISC's shareholding exercise is in ways of special action,shareholders meeting and online exercise.Further research finds that the promotion effect of the CSISC's shareholding exercise on labor investment efficiency enhances firm performance and firm value.Therefore,it is necessary to give full play to the role of the CSISC's shareholding exercise in improving labor investment efficiency,to improve corporate governance and to protect the interests of small and medium investors.