非支配审议:亚里士多德的政治性概念

Deliberation with Non-domination:the“Political”in Aristotle s Politics

亚里士多德的政治性概念可以根据政治统治中的审议和说服进行重新阐释,这一活动既不受限于少数人建制式的政治视野,也不需要公民共享某种团结友爱,而是人们出于免受他者支配的意愿试图说服对方,最终持对立主张的公民能够在不给予少数人更大权力的情况下共同制定良好决策。考察亚里士多德的《政治学》和《修辞学》可以发现,一方面政治统治并非最佳可能政体中需要实现的政治理想,而是使得政治生活得以可能的必要条件,另一方面“说服”在民主审议中是一种让公民接受某种正义主张的重要修辞方式。亚里士多德的政治性概念可以取代霍布斯的政治性概念,前者在同样深刻洞察社会政治冲突的对抗本性后却没有像后者主张通过国家强制力来确保政治秩序,而是提出非支配的调节性原则来引导相互对抗的人们进行民主审议和决策。

The Hobbesian conception of the“political”still dominates the sociopolitical literature on democratic deliberation and its institutional realization.Epistemologically,it seeks to investigate the nature of politics or the essence of the“political”based on pessimistic presuppositions about human nature and its antagonistic sociopolitical manifestations.Philosophically,it tends to place the“political”beyond moral or ethical judgments by neutralizing sociopolitical claims as equally legitimate justifications for self-preservation.It is undeniable that the Hobbesian conception of the political is valuable.However,it cannot meet the general demands for democratic deliberation.First,the concern about the antagonistic nature of sociopolitical conflict can direct democratic deliberation in an antidemocratic direction.Second,the emphasis on the need for political order cannot automatically provide us with a regulative principle with which individuals or citizens can resist the stronger whose arbitrary domination ultimately annihilates their desire for protection as well as their pursuit of a better life.Based on these observations,this paper sheds light on Aristotle s conception of the“political”in his Politics,particularly with respect to deliberation in the political rule which is not constrained by an architectonic political view or a shared solidarity but guided by persuasion based on the fear of domination under which antagonistic contentions between citizens can contribute to making a tolerably good decision without empowering anyone who knows better.More specifically,I will develop two arguments in this paper.First,investigating Aristotle s conception of the“political”in the Politics,I will maintain that the“political”rule()is not a political ideal to be realized in the best possible regime but the necessary condition for making political life possible.Aristotle clearly explicates in the Politics that the aristocratic qualification for“ruling”in his statements on political craft or science does not nullify democratic qualifications for political rule.At this juncture,distinction and knowledge are not opposed to democratic authority but conducive to democratic deliberation.Second,exploring“persuasion”as the most imperative way in which a particular claim about justice may be justified in democratic deliberation,I will argue that in Aristotle s conception of the“political”,non-domination can be a regulative principle which steers diverse claims for justice in democratic deliberation toward reasonable agreement.All in all,this paper suggests the conception of the“political”in Aristotle s Politics as an alternative to the Hobbesian conception of the“political”that has been criticized for its excessive emphasis on the need for coercive power.A more feasible picture for the role of experts in democratic deliberation can be found in the Aristotelian conception of the political.In this picture,the basic impulse that binds the knowledgeable few and the multitude is the desire for non-domination.