媒体负面报道、印象管理与策略性环境治理

Negative Media Coverage,Impression Management and Strategic Environmental Governance

本文从理论上提出了公司采取策略性环境治理进行印象管理应对媒体负面报道的研究假说,从实证上检验了媒体负面报道对公司策略性环境治理的影响及所有权治理的调节效应。研究发现:公司会通过加大可视的环保投资进行印象构建,缓解和转移媒体负面报道产生的声誉压力,但由于环保投资增加生产成本带来绩效压力,公司可能会闲置环保设施甚至扩大生产以分摊投资成本,造成污染排放问题没能有效解决反而加剧。在媒体负面报道所驱动的公司策略性环境治理中,国有所有权因代理问题表现出更强的印象管理动机,机构投资者对短期投资收益的关注反而抑制了公司为实现印象管理而采取的策略性环境治理。

The paper theoretically proposes the research hypothesis that companies adopt strategic environmental governance for impression manage-ment in response to negative media coverage,and empirically tests the impact of negative media coverage on companies'strategic environmental governance and the moderating mechanisms of ownerships.The paper finds that companies will not only mitigate reputational pressure from negative media coverage by increasing visible environmental investments for impression building,but also raise their pollution emission to cope with the performance pressure caused by increasing investment costs.Furthermore,state ownership exhibits stronger motivation for impression management due to higher reputational sensitivity and lower performance pressure,but institutional investors inhibit strategic environmental governance for costly impression management due to their goal of interestpursuing.