增量审计费用、审计师盈余管理默助与审计意见表达——来自中国上市公司的实证证据

Incremental Audit Fees,Earnings Management with Tacit Cooperation and Audit Opinion:Evidence from China

当公司有向上盈余管理需求时,支付更多的审计费用能否得到审计师默助,审计师又是如何应对其新增风险?本文研究发现:在公司有向上盈余管理需求时,增量审计费用会激励审计师对管理层认定的向上盈余管理有更高容忍度的再认定,导致报告利润中含有更多的向上盈余管理;对此,尽管审计师并不倾向出具非标审计意见,但会扩大核心应计项目关键审计事项的审查范围以应对新增的审计风险。本文基于审计重要性水平以“认定-再认定”视角打开了管理层和审计师互动“黑箱”,发现增量审计费用的双重效应:“挤出效应”和“激励效应”,并提出了默助观,拓展了成本观和租金观的内涵。据此,本文建议:将审计重要性水平信息披露的要求修订进审计准则。

When the management require upward earnings management,do auditors achieve tacit cooperation for incremental audit fees and how do auditors cope with concomitant audit risks?This paper finds that when the management require upward earnings management,incremental audit fees can stimulate auditors to accept a higher residual upward earnings management in reported profits.Although auditors will not have a propensity to issue a quali-fied audit opinion,they will disclose more key audit matters regarding accrual earnings management in dealing with consequent audit risks.Based on the audit materiality level,this paper uses the management's audit assertions and auditors'reassertions to reveal their tacit interactive mechanism and the con-notative duality of incremental audit fees(i.e.,crowding-out effect and incentive effect),and proposes the view of tacit cooperation,thus making mar-ginal academic contributions in views of audit costs and auditor rents.Therefore,this paper suggests that disclosure of the information about audit material-ity should be incorporated in the auditing standards.