针对ZUC算法硬件实现的相关能量攻击与多粒度时域敏感区域检测

Correlation Power Analysis of Hardware-Implemented ZUC Algorithms and Multi-Granularity Time-Domain Sensitive Area Detection

本文通过合理分解模加操作,优化流水线结构,构建ZUC算法硬件实现,并基于FPGA开发板搭建ZUC算法功耗采集平台.构建粗细粒度时域敏感区域的泄漏检测方法,利用移动平均算子,发掘高信噪比风险区域,采用自相关滤波器与峰值检测算子,发掘具有明显重复特征的运算区间,并对泄漏高风险区域进行标定,实现高精度的泄漏风险定位.通过分析ZUC算法的脆弱性,本文提出一种基于选择初始向量IV的CPA攻击方案,对输入的IV信息进行选择,通过固定部分明文的方法有效提高采集信号的信噪比,并采集实际3000条功耗曲线,在算法初始化首轮,成功提取8 bit密钥信息,从而证明该方案的有效性,对ZUC算法的硬件实现进行侧信道防护是必要的.总结ZUC算法侧信道防护方案,对比方案优劣.

This study decomposes modulo operations to implement the ZUC steam cipher algorithm in hardware environment and builds ZUC steam cipher energy consumption acquisition platform based on FPGA board.A detection method for sensitive area leaking of coarse-grained time-domain is constructed.The moving average operator is used to explore the risk area of high signal-to-noise ratio,the autocorrelation filter and peak detection operator are used to discover the operation interval with obvious repetitive characteristics and the high-risk leakage area is calibrated to achieve high-precision leakage risk location.Based on that,this paper proposes a CPA attack scheme based on the selection of initial vector to extract key information of the ZUC algorithm.By fixing some parts of plaintext,this paper implemented the scheme and successfully extracted the 8 bit key in the first round of algorithm initialization with only 3000 energy consumption traces,which shows the validity of the scheme.The pros and cons of the new implementation of the ZUC algorithm against side channel attack are discussed.