地方债务置换与融资平台债务扩张

Local-Government Debt Swap and Debt Expansion of Financing Platforms

中央主导债务置换极易强化地方政府的救助预期。本文将通过依申请公开途径收集整理的241个城市2015-2018年置换债券和融资平台新增城投债数据相匹配,研究债务置换对融资平台债务扩张的影响。结果发现,债务置换导致融资平台城投债净发行额增多,其内在机制在于债务置换激励了地方财政支出(尤其是投资性支出)过度扩张并且降低了投资支出效率,由此助长了新增城投债的举债需求。异质性分析发现,上述影响主要存在于地方政府债务管理体制改革尚未落实、出现专项债券用途调整、PPP项目融资规模较小、省以下财政体制改革不完善和金融监管力度较弱的城市。拓展分析表明,债务置换阻碍了融资平台的市场化转型,不利于提升融资平台的自生能力。本文的分析为研究债务置换与地方隐性债务风险提供了新的经验证据,同时对建立防范化解地方债务风险长效机制提供政策启示。

In order to strengthen local budget constraints and regulate the borrowing and financing behavior of local governments,China's central government granted local governments the right to raise debt,stripped them of the government financing function of financing platforms,and implemented debt swap.The central government has established a comprehensive institutional framework to regulate local borrowing and prevent risks by opening the front door and blocking the back door.However,an undeniable fact is that after 2015,local governments still engaged in illegal and irregular borrowing and financing.This paper is the first to use data from local market exchange bonds and newly-issued urban construction investment bonds(UCIBs)to study the relationship between debt exchange and local implicit debt.The benchmark regression results show that debt swap leads to an increase in new UCIBs on financing platforms.Mechanism analysis reveals that the addition of UCIBs by financing platforms is a joint result of the excessive expansion of local fiscal expenditure and the decrease in debt investment efficiency.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the positive impact of debt swap on the issuance of new UCIBs is more significant in regions where local government debt management system reform is not yet implemented,where adjustments have been made to the use of special bonds,PPP financing scale is relatively small,the fiscal system reform below the provincial level is incomplete,and financial regulation is weak.Further research has found that debt swap is not conducive to improving the self-sufficiency and market-oriented transformation of financing platforms.The marginal contribution of this paper is mainly reflected in the following three aspects.Firstly,this paper first explores the impact of debt swap on the expansion of new implicit debt from the perspective of the relationship between the resolution of existing debt and the control of incremental debt at the city level.Secondly,it provides a new mechanism explanation for how debt swap affects the expansion of new implicit debt from the perspective of local governments'rescue expectations.Finally,this paper also conducted a rich heterogeneity analysis and made a preliminary discussion on the impact of debt swap on the market-oriented transformation of financing platforms.This paper has the following policy recommendations.Firstly,debt swap should be cautious of the risk of new implicit debts and not adopted unless necessary.Secondly,we should continue to promote the market-oriented transformation of financing platforms,and in the future,we need to gradually open up debt defaults on financing platforms and orderly overcome the blind belief in urban construction investment.Finally,we should coordinate the reform of the fiscal system and strengthen the supervision of local debt,establish a long-term mechanism for preventing and resolving local debt risks,and further promote positive interaction between effective markets and promising governments.In fact,the impact of debt swap is very broad,and newly added implicit debt is just one of them.Therefore,future research may study the other economic impact of debt swap.