基于三方演化博弈的农业绿色生产实现路径研究

Analysis on the Path of Agriculture Green Production:Based on Tripartite Game

为实现农业绿色可持续发展,构建政府、企业、农户三方演化博弈模型,分析政府政策激励企业、企业驱动引导农户参与绿色生产的交互作用机理,探究三方协同发展的最优实现路径,并对其稳定均衡条件进行了数值仿真。研究表明:(1)农业绿色生产存在两类实现路径:一类是由政府率先规制,引导企业组织生产,激发农户参与的政府驱动型实现路径;另一类是由企业率先组织绿色生产,引导农户参与,达到一定市场规模后,政府介入干预的市场驱动型实现路径。(2)政府、企业、农户的行为选择存在相互影响关系,企业与农户的行为具有一致性,政府直接作用于企业,间接影响农户行为。当满足一定条件时,系统将趋于理想均衡的稳定状态。(3)适度的经济激励、高于一定阈值的惩罚与企业和农户净收益等有利于实现三方的最优策略均衡。

In order to realize the green and sustainable development of agriculture,this paper constructs a tripartite evolutionary game model of government,enterprise and farmers,analyzes the interaction mechanism of government policy incentives for enterprises and enterprise-driven guidance for farmers to participate in green production,explores the optimal evolutionary path for the synergistic development of the three parties and carries out a numerical simulation of its stable equilibrium conditions.The study shows that:(1)there are two types of evolution paths in the dynamic game between government,enterprise and farmers:one is the government-driven evolution path in which the government takes the lead in adopting green regulation strate-gies,guides enterprises to organize inputs,and then inspires farmers to participate;the other is the marketdriven evolution path in which enterprises take the lead in organizing green production,guides farmers to par-ticipate,and the government intervenes under a certain market scale;(2)the behaviors of the government,enterprises and farmers have a mutual influence on each other's choices.choice has a mutual influence rela-tionship,the behavior of enterprises and farmers has consistency,the government acts directly on enterprises and indirectly affects the behavior of farmers,and the system will tend to the ideal equilibrium state when cer-tain conditions are met;(3)Within a certain threshold interval,the parameters of government incentives and penalties,the allocation ratio of enterprises,and the benefits and costs of enterprises and vegetable farmers have different degrees of influence on the behavioral changes of the three parties'green production.degree of influencing effect.