开放式创新平台知识共创机制:随机演化博弈视角

Knowledge Co-creation Mechanism of Open Innovation Platform:A Stochastic Evolutionary Game Perspective

通过开放式创新平台汇聚互补性资源进行知识共创,是企业获取持续竞争优势的核心过程,而该过程因共创主体的利益冲突呈现高度复杂性和不确定性。因此,研究通过考虑高斯白噪声构建随机演化博弈模型,深入探讨随机干扰下开放式创新平台知识共创机制,以理解知识共创过程的复杂性。研究表明,主体策略演化过程的波动幅度与随机扰动强度成正相关关系,且知识共创具有脆弱性;与偏袒任何一方的分配策略相比,公平分配收益更有助于主体知识共创,这反映公平偏好等非理性情感会影响行为策略;适度的激励政策有效促使主体实施知识共创行为,避免较高和较低的激励政策的低效激励作用;相互共享知识比单边隐藏知识更能使知识共创达到均衡状态,但相互共享和单边隐藏也会分别产生知识泄露和信任危机问题。

Bringing together complementary resources for knowledge co-creation through an open innovation platform is the core process for enterprises to obtain sustainable competitive advantage,and the process presents a high degree of complexity and uncertainty due to the conflicting interests of co-creators.Therefore,this research constructs a stochastic evolutionary game model by considering Gaussian white noise,and deeply explores the knowledge co-creation mechanism of open innovation platforms under stochastic disturbance in order to understand the complexity of the knowledge co-creation process.This study shows that the fluctuation range of the evolution process of the agent's strategy is positively correlated with the intensity of stochastic perturbation,and knowledge co-creation is fragile.Compared with the distribution strategy that favors any party,the fair distribution of income is more conducive to the knowledge co-creation of the subject,which reflects that irrational emotions such as fairness preferences can affect behavioral strategies.The appropriate incentive policy can effectively promote the subject to implement the knowledge co-creation behavior and avoids the inefficient incentive effect of higher and lower incentive policies.Mutual sharing of knowledge is better than unilateral hiding of knowledge to achieve equilibrium in knowledge co-creation,but mutual sharing and unilateral hiding will also generate knowledge leakage and trust crisis,respectively.