社会责任电商品牌商优惠券投放策略研究

Coupon Strategy of E-commerce Brander with Social Responsibility

在电商优惠的背景下,基于信号博弈理论,本文构建了一个社会责任电商品牌商与消费者之间的策略互动模型。由于外部市场的限制,本文利用优惠券策略实现信号传递,并关注了电商品牌商成本差异、消费者敏感性和敏感消费者比例对电商品牌商市场优惠策略的影响。研究结果表明,在完全信息下,消费者对优惠券的敏感性大于对价格的敏感性时,电商品牌商才有利可图,且电商品牌商收益随敏感消费者比例增加而递增。在不完全信息下,当敏感消费者的敏感性较低时,电商品牌商成本差异越小,低社会责任电商品牌商模仿动机越强,社会责任电商品牌商越偏好选择分离和混同策略。此外,不同于完全信息下的结论,由于信息号传递的成本,市场中具有社会责任意识的消费者越多,反而可能对品牌商不利。在混同策略下,低社会责任电商品牌商通过搭便车行为可以获得更高的收益。

In the context of e-commerce coupon,coupons have become an important means for branders to sell products.However,the branders with social responsibility have to take the cost of social responsibility and consumer differences into account when adopting coupon strategy.Based on the signaling theory,a strategic interaction model is constructed between the brander with social responsibility and consumers.Because of the restriction from external market,keeping the platform pricing unchanged,coupon strategy is used to signal and focuse on impacts of the cost difference of the brander,consumer sensitivity and the proportion of sensitive consumers on the brander.Our results suggest that:under complete information,as consumers are more sensitive to coupon than to price,the brander will benefit from it,and the profit of the brander increases in the proportion of sensitive consumers.Under incomplete information,when sensitive consumers show a low sensitivity,with a smaller cost difference of social responsibility,the brander with low social responsibility shows a stronger motivation in imitation,and the brander with social responsibility shows more preference to separating strategy and pooling strategy.Additionally,deffer from the results under complete information,duo to the cost of signaling,more sensitive consumers with sense of social responsibility may be adverse to the brander.While,under pooling strategy,it is shown that the brander with low social responsibility can get higher profit through the free riding.