企业生态创新驱动系统激励政策优化研究

Research on Incentive Policy Optimization of Enterprise Ecological Innovation Driving System

为驱动企业自发生态创新,探究环境规制政策的合理化边界,本文搭建政府、公众和企业三方演化博弈模型,并在此基础上设计线性动态惩罚方案和非线性动态惩罚-补贴方案,利用响应曲面法求解非线性动态方案下二次项补贴函数的最优系数值。借助仿真工具与李雅普诺夫定理双重验证三个不同阶段企业生态创新行为的稳定情况。研究结果表明:(1)静态方案下企业自主采取生态创新的意愿随机性强,呈不稳定状态。(2)线性方案可促使系统稳定但非最优状态。(3)在非线性动态惩罚-补贴方案下系统可达到最优稳定状态,生态创新可持续发展。研究结论可为设计非线性动态激励政策提供参考。

In the context of tight environmental regulations,companies have frequent strategic innovations.The purpose of this paper is to drive the spontaneous innovation of enterprises and explore the rational boundaries of environmental regulatory policies.A three-party evolutionary game model is built for the government,the public and enterprises,and linear dynamic penalty schemes and nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy schemes are deigned on this basis.The Box-Behnken method is used to solve the optimal coefficient value of the quadratic subsidy function under the nonlinear dynamic scheme.With the aid of simulation tools and Lyapunov's theorem,the stability of the enterprise's ecological innovation behavior in three different stages is double verified.The results show that:(1)The willingness of enterprises to independently adopt ecological innovation under the static scheme is highly random and unstable.(2)The linear scheme can promote the stable but non-optimal state of the system.(3)Under the nonlinear dynamic penalty-subsidy scheme,the system can reach an optimal stable state,and ecological innovation becomes a long-term strategy.The conclusions can provide a reference for the design of nonlinear dynamic incentive policy research.