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充电基础设施补贴该如何审时度势?基于多方动态博弈分析

How should Charging Infrastructure Subsidies Assess the Situation? Analysis Based on Multi-party Dynamic Game
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摘要 为了促进充电基础设施的发展,国家陆续出台了多项激励性宏观政策。在此基础上,全国多个省份的充电基础设施补贴政策相继落地,但做法不一,效果差异大。为了探究不同补贴方式的激励效果和政策调整的窗口条件,本研究在同时考虑充电基础设施建桩数量和服务水平的基础上,构建了多方动态博弈模型,并进行了求解分析和算例分析。研究发现:政府采取补贴策略要综合考虑电动汽车行业的发展情况、充电基础设施建设运营企业的运营能力和盈利能力等因素。在电动汽车绿色效应不足、充电基础设施建设运营企业运营能力较弱的情况下宜采用建设补贴;而在电动汽车绿色效应高、充电基础设施建设运营企业运营能力强时采取运营补贴可以达到更优的补贴绩效。本研究为政府适时有效地调整补贴方式、提高补贴效率,更好地促进电动汽车推广提供了参考意见。 To encourage the development of charging infrastructure,the government has created a series of macro-level incentive programs.On this premise,the charging infrastructure subsidy policies of a number of provinces and municipalities around the nation have been adopted successively,albeit with vastly diverse methods and results.To investigate the incentive effects of different subsidy approaches and the window conditions for policy adjustment,a multi-party dynamic game model with the goal of maximizing the government's subsidy performance is developed,based on both the number of piles constructed and the operation level of charging infrastructure,and analytical analysis and arithmetic analysis of different subsidy approaches are conducted.It is determined that the government's subsidy plan should reject the one-size-fits-all reward and subsidy standards and need consider the growth of the electric vehicle sector,the operational capability and profitability of charging infrastructure building and operation businesses.Specifically,when the green effect of EVs is insufficient and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is weak,it is appropriate to adopt construction subsidies;when the green effect of EVs is high and the operational capacity of charging infrastructure construction and operation enterprises is strong,adopting operational subsidies can achieve better subsidy performance.Finally,it is suggested that,in the early stages of charging infrastructure enterprise development,the government should provide subsidies to alleviate pressure on enterprises and promote enterprise investment.As the charging infrastructure industry matures,the government can gradually eliminate subsidies or even taxes if the enterprise's profitability is high enough and the proportion of electric vehicles charging in public charging infrastructure is high enough.This study offers the government with references for adjusting the subsidy system in a timely and effective manner,enhancing the subsidy's efficiency,and promoting electric vehicles more effectively.
作者 凌帅 郭济源 李悦 马寿峰 Shuai Ling;Jiyuan Guo;Yue Li;Shoufeng Ma(College of Management and Economics,Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072,China;Laboratory of Computation and Analytics of Complex Management Systems(CACMS),Tianjin University,Tianjin,300072)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2024年第6期290-300,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金面上项目(72271181) 重点国际合作研究项目(72010107004)。
关键词 充电基础设施 补贴策略 动态博弈 建设补贴 运营补贴 charging infrastructure subsidy strategy dynamic game construction subsidy operation subsidy
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