考虑仿冒商威胁的正品制造商销售模式选择策略

Sales model selection strategy for genuine manufacturers considering threat of counterfeiters

针对仿冒商进入市场引起的消费者权益难以保证,正品市场份额被抢占,正常的市场秩序受到破坏等问题,在考虑同时受欺骗型和非欺骗型仿冒商威胁的情形下,正品制造商通过零售商进行转售或自有渠道直销的两种销售模式,建立Stackelberg博弈对比研究正品制造商的两种销售模式的均衡结果,分析正品制造商的销售模式选择策略,探讨其销售模式选择策略对两类仿冒商的打击效果以及对消费者剩余和社会福利的影响.研究结果表明:正品制造商可能不会为了维护消费者利益而选择直销模式;正品制造商选择直销模式的意愿随消费者在转售模式下对正品和欺骗型仿冒品的感知质量及欺骗型仿冒品质量的提高而减小,随非欺骗型仿冒品质量的提高而增大;正品制造商选择直销模式总能有效打击非欺骗型仿冒商,然而,对欺骗型仿冒商而言,在一定条件下,正品制造商会选择转售模式并容忍欺骗型仿冒商的存在;正品制造商选择直销模式能够提高消费者剩余和社会福利.

To address the problems caused by the entry of counterfeiters into the market,such as the difficulty in guaranteeing consumers’rights and interests,the market share of genuine manufacturers being taken away,and the disruption of normal market order,we establish two sales models of genuines manufacturer reselling through retailers or selling directly through own channels.The Stackelberg game is used to compare the equilibrium results of the two sales models and analyze the optimal sales model selection strategy.We also explore the combating effect on the two counterfeiters and the impact on consumer surplus and social welfare.The results show that genuine manufacturers may not choose the direct sales model to protect consumer interests.The incentive for genuine manufacturers to choose the direct sales model decreases along with the consumers’perceived quality of genuine and deceptive counterfeits in the resale model and the quality of deceptive counterfeits,and increases with the quality of non-deceptive counterfeits;the direct sales strategy of genuines manufacturer is always effective against non-deceptive counterfeiters.However,genuine manufacturers will choose the resale model and tolerate deceptive counterfeiters under certain conditions.The genuine manufacturers’direct sales strategy can increase consumer surplus and social welfare.