法律实证主义“社会事实命题”概念谱系反思与厘定

Reflecting and Defining Conceptual Pedigree of“Social Facts”from the Perspective of Legal Positivism

在以实在法为研究对象的法律实证主义中,作为法律实证主义基本命题的社会事实命题不仅语焉不详,作为“社会事实命题”的社会事实概念也模糊不清。社会事实的概念谱系包括规范性、价值、惯习等,这些概念不仅与社会事实的关系扑朔迷离,也展现了社会事实概念的多重可能性。正因为社会事实概念的多重可能性,社会事实命题在奥斯丁等法律实证主义者们的论述中呈现出不同的内容。社会事实不同于自然事实,它可以按照不同的分类标准呈现出简单事实与复杂事实、规范事实与非规范事实等样态。社会事实概念可以具有一定的价值,这突破了传统法理学界对事实与价值二分的哲学范式,并成为社会事实能否上升为规范事实的关键要素之一。

In legal positivism with actual law as the objective,neither the“social facts thesis”,one of the basic theses of legal positivism,nor“social facts”as a concept within this thesis is clear.The conceptual pedigree of“social facts”includes normativity,value,and convention.The blurring between“social facts”and the concepts within its pedigree shows the multiple possibilities of“social facts”.It is precisely owing to the multiple possibilities of“social facts”that the“social facts”thesis displays different contents in the discussions of Austin and other legal positivists.“Social facts”is different from“natural facts”,in that the former one can be divided into simple facts and complex facts,normative facts and non-normative facts according to different classification criteria.The concept of“social facts”have certain values,which not only breaks through the philosophical paradigm of dichotomy between facts and values in traditional jurisprudence,but also becomes one of key factors in determining whether“social facts”can be transformed into“normative facts”.