大国竞争中的技术遏制与反遏制

Technology Containment and Counter-Containment in Major Power Competition

后发追赶国家应该如何动态有效地应对来自领先大国的技术遇制?现有相关经济理论缺乏对国际关系的考量,而现有国际关系理论则对企业等微观主体的市场行为研究不足。构建一个包含国际关系动态博奔的一般均衡经济学理论框架可以发现:当领先大国出于内生的霸权利益考虑而选择对后发追赶国家进行技术遇制时,后者可以通过补贴本国生产和研发进行反遇制,且最优补贴率随着所受技术遇制程度的增加而提高。虽然补贴政策在短期可能引发更严苛的技术遇制,但会缩短技术遇制的时长,并在中长期实现更高的福利水平。而考虑到现实中补贴政策可能引发的企业“道德风险”等问题,后发追赶国家还需采取包括竞争政策在内的其他可行性策略。此外,通过增强国防战略型产业对民用产业技术溢出的效率,亦可提升后发追赶国家的反遇制能力与效果。

In the arena of major power rivalry,latecomer nations face the challenge of dynamically and effectively countering technological containment strategies employed by established leaders.Existing economic theories lack consideration of international relations,while current international relations theories do not sufficiently study the market behavior of micro-entities such as enterprises.A synthesized general equilibrium economic model incorporating dynamic international relational game theory reveals that latecomers can enact counter-containment measures,such as subsidizing domestic production and R&D,in response to technological suppression by hegemonic powers.The model suggests an optimal subsidy rate that escalates with increasing containment intensity.While subsidies may initially intensify containment efforts,they ultimately shorten their duration and elevate welfare outcomes over time.However,given the real-world risks of"moral hazards"induced by subsidies,latecomers must also consider alternative strategies such as competition policies.Furthermore,leveraging spllover efficiencies from defense-centric industries to civilian sectors can also enhance the effectiveness of counter-containment efforts by the latecomer country.