非国有股东超额委派董事能提升MD&A信息含量吗

Can the over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders improve the information content of MD&A?

新形势下,国有企业通过引入非国有资本以完善公司治理和市场化运营成为重要议题。现有关于非国有股东委派董事的研究大多关注经营与投资决策,鲜有涉及MD&A信息含量的相关探讨,因此,本文以2013—2021年国有上市公司为研究样本,实证检验了非国有股东超额委派董事对MD&A信息含量的影响及其机理。研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事能显著提升MD&A信息含量;异质性检验发现,当公司治理水平较低和产品市场竞争程度较高时,非国有股东超额委派董事的作用更为明显;机制研究发现,非国有股东超额委派董事主要通过提供增量信息与发挥监督效应的渠道提升MD&A信息含量;经济后果检验发现,信息含量的提升显著提高了资本配置效率与外部投资者信心。研究结论为有效推动混合所有制改革,充分发挥非国有资本参与治理提供了新的视角与经验证据。

Under the new situation,state-owned enterprises have become an important topic to improve modern corporate governance and market-oriented operation by introducing non-state-owned capital.Therefore,this paper takes state-owned listed companies from 2013 to 2021 as research samples to empirically test the impact and mechanism of non-state-owned shareholders’over-appointment of directors on MD&A information content.The study finds that the over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders can significantly improve the information content of MD&A.The heterogeneity test found that when the level of corporate governance was low and the degree of competition in the product market was high,the role of non-state-owned shareholders in over-appointing directors was more obvious.The mechanism study finds that the over-appointment of directors by non-state-owned shareholders mainly improves the information content of MD&A through the channels of providing incremental information and exerting supervision effect.The economic consequence test shows that the improvement of information content significantly improves the efficiency of capital allocation and the confidence of external investors.The conclusions of this study provide new perspectives and empirical evidence for effectively promoting the reform of mixed ownership and giving full play to the participation of non-state-owned capital in governance.