摘要
本文基于政治成本和融资成本视角,利用2010年出台《上市公司环境信息披露指南》这一具有“准自然实验”性质的外生事件,实证检验强制环境信息披露对重污染企业盈余管理的影响。结果发现,该指南出台后,重污染企业进行显著向下的盈余管理活动,该结论在非国有企业样本中体现得尤为明显。另外,重污染企业是基于政治成本的考虑而非融资成本进行向下的盈余管理,即重污染企业向下盈余管理主要是博取监管同情而非资本同情。
Based on the perspective of Political Cost and Finance Cost,this paper empirically tests the impact of mandatory environmental information disclosure on the earnings management of heavily polluting enterprises by using the exogenous event with the nature of“quasi-natural experiment”issued in 2010 to the“Guidelines for Environmental Information Disclosure of Listed Companies”.It was found that after the guidelines were issued,heavily polluting enterprises carried out significantly downward earnings management activities,which was particularly evident in the sample of non-state-owned enterprises.In addition,the downward earnings management of heavy polluting enterprises is based on the consideration of political cost rather than financing cost,that is,the downward earnings management of heavy polluting enterprises is mainly to win regulatory sympathy rather than capital sympathy.
作者
崔海涛
张延良
冯佳浩
Cui Haitao;Zhang Yanliang;Feng Jiahao
出处
《投资研究》
北大核心
2024年第6期140-159,共20页
Review of Investment Studies
关键词
强制环境信息披露
重污染企业
盈余管理
Mandatory environmental information disclosure
Heavy polluting enterprises
Earnings management