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为哈特式司法裁量权辩护 ——以德沃金前期批判与后期批判为主线

In Defense of Hart's Judicial Discretion—Following the Thread of Dworkin's Early and Late Criticism
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摘要 对于哈特基于实证主义法律图景推导出的司法裁量权,德沃金分别以“权利”为中心与以“解释”为中心展开了批判。前期批判以规则与原则的界分为依据,认为“规则空缺结构”处可依原则裁判,这种批判忽视了拔掉“语义之刺”之前,内在于规则的原则不存在独立于规则的不同指引方向。后期批判以“理论争议”消解社会规则,并提出法律是一个建构性解释并兼顾“符合”与“证立”的叙事。这种批判在法概念论与裁判理论都是失败的:法概念论层面,德沃金前解释阶段要求的“高程度共识”肯定了“法律是什么”这一描述性法律事业的必要性;裁判理论层面,德沃金为弱司法裁量划定且其并不反对的“判断”与“决断”,其实预设了法律问题可能具有两个以上的正确答案,这与德沃金整全法的“唯一正解”直接冲突。“符合”与“证立”的不可通约性难题也不能用“整全性作为海王星”这种隐喻得到解决。这两个阶段之批判的失败意味着,一个受完美法官赫拉克勒斯指引的德沃金式法官,会走向与之反对的哈特式法官的道路。 Dworkin criticized the judicial discretion derived by Hart based on the legal picture of legal positivism,with“right”and“interpretation”as the center respectively.The early criticism is based on the distinction between rules and principles,and thinks that the“open texture”can be judged according to principles.This criticism ignores that before the“semantic thorn”is removed,the principle of rules does not exist different directions independent of rules.In the later stage,he criticized social rules with“theoretical disputes”,and proposed that law is a narrative of constructive interpretation that takes into account both“conformity”and“justification”.This criticism fails both in the conceptual theory of law and in the theory of judgment.On the conceptual level of law,the“high degree of consensus”required by Dworkin's pre-interpretation stage presupposes the necessity of law as the descriptive legal undertaking.On the level of judicial theory,Dworkin s“judgment”and“decision”,which he delineates as weak judicial discretion and does not object to,actually presupposes the conclusion that there are more than two correct answers to legal questions,which is in direct conflict with the“only right answer”of Dworkin's law as integrity.The incommensurability problem of“conformity”and“justification”cannot be solved by the metaphor of“integrality as Neptune”.The failure of criticism in two stages meant that a Dworkin judge,guided by the perfect judge Hercules,would go the way of a Hart-style judge who opposed it.
作者 曾聪 Zeng Cong
出处 《南大法学》 CSSCI 2024年第4期71-89,共19页 NanJing University Law Journal
关键词 哈特 司法裁量权 德沃金 原则 解释 Hart Judicial Discretion Dworkin Principle Interpretation
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