梯次利用后动力电池回收演化博弈分析

Evolutionary Game Analysis of Power Battery Recovery after Cascade Utilization

为更好地处理和处置梯次利用后报废的动力电池,助力“双碳”目标,需探讨这类动力电池在逆向物流过程中各利益相关者的成本及效用。通过建立“双碳”目标下的政府、梯次利用企业和再生回收商之间的演化博弈模型,分析均衡点的局部稳定性,并对各博弈主体的演化过程进行仿真研究,讨论关键参数对参与方行为演化的影响。研究表明:(1)环境效益显著影响政府和梯次利用企业的策略选择。环境效益降低时,政府更倾向于宽松监管,而梯次利用企业则更倾向选择第三方回收战略。(2)提高政府抽查概率可以促使梯次利用企业与回收商选择参与回收作为稳定策略,但两者在同样条件下对战略选择的敏感度不同。因此,监管政策需要针对不同类型的企业实施差异化的监管和处罚,尤其是加大对梯次利用企业的监管处罚力度。(3)当梯次利用企业和回收商共同搭建的回收渠道的总成本不变时,其成本分摊系数的变化对系统稳定性的影响不显著。

In order to better process and dispose of the power batteries that are scrapped after cascade utilization,and help the“double carbon”goal,it is necessary to explore the costs and benefits of various stakeholders in the reverse logistics process of these power batteries.By establishing an evolutionary game model among the government,cascade utilization enterprises,and recycling businesses under the“dual-carbon”goal,we analyze the local stability of the equilibrium point and simulate the evolutionary process of each gaming agent.We also discuss the impact of key parameters on the behavioral evolution of the participating parties.Research shows that:(1)Environmental benefits significantly influence the strategic choices of the government and enterprises involved in cascade utilization.When environmental benefits decrease,the government tends to lean towards relaxed regulation,while enterprises in cascade utilization are more inclined to opt for third-party recycling strategies.(2)Increasing the probability of government inspections can encourage enterprises in cascade utilization and recyclers to choose participation in recycling as a stable strategy,but their sensitivity to strategic choices under the same conditions is different.Therefore,regulatory policies need to be differentiated according to the type of enterprise,especially increasing the regulatory penalties for enterprises in cascade utilization.(3)When the total cost of the recycling channel jointly established by enterprises in cascade utilization and recyclers remains unchanged,the variation in the costsharing coefficient does not significantly affect the stability of the system.