供应链中断风险防范化解行为——三方主体演化博弈分析

Behavior of Supply Chain Disruption Risk Prevention and Solution:A Tripartite Evolutionary Game Analysis

基于主体价值最大化原则,构建政府、供应链企业与行业协会三方防范化解供应链中断风险行为的演化博弈模型,并进行均衡分析,运用MATLAB仿真三方防范化解行为的策略选择过程。结果表明:(1)政府“负责任监督预防”策略概率x是关于政府“负责任监督预防”收益R_1、供应链中断风险规模S、社会声誉效应M、政府扶持资金W、政府承担供应链中断风险的份额p、政府获社会声誉效应的分配比例q的增函数,是关于政府“负责任监督预防”成本C_1的减函数;(2)供应链企业“负责任防范化解”策略概率y是关于企业“负责任防范化解”收益R_2、政府扶持资金W、企业获政府扶持资金的分配比例β的增函数,是关于企业“负责任防范化解”成本C_2、供应链中断风险规模S、政府承担供应链中断风险的份额p的减函数;(3)行业协会“负责任引导”策略概率z是关于行业协会“负责任引导”收益R_3、社会声誉效应M、政府扶持资金W、政府获社会声誉效应的分配比例q、企业获政府扶持资金的分配比例β的增函数,是关于行业协会“负责任引导”成本C_3的减函数;(4)政府策略选择对承担供应链中断风险的份额p较敏感,当政府承担供应链中断风险份额p大于80%时,政府倾向选择“不负责任监督预防”策略;(5)行业协会策略选择对企业获政府扶持资金的分配比例β较敏感,当企业获政府扶持资金的分配比例β高于90%时,行业协会出于自身价值最大化的目的,倾向于选择“不负责任引导”策略。

Based on the principle of maximum value,we constructed a behavioral evolution game model for the three subjects of the government,supply chain enterprises and industrial associations to prevent and resolve the risk of supply chain disruption,and conducted an equilibrium analysis.Using MATLAB,we sim-ulated the strategy selection process of the three subjects.The results show that(1)the probability of government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk pre-vention(x)is an increasing function of revenue for the government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention(R1),supply chain disruption risk scale(S),social reputation effect(M),government support funds(W),the government'proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p),and the government's proportion of social reputation effect(q),and a decreasing function of cost for the government taking charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention(C1).(2)The probability of the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(y)is an in-creasing function of revenue for the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(R2),government support funds(W)and the enterprise's proportion of government support funds(β),and a de-creasing function of cost for the enterprise taking charge of supply chain disruption risk resolution(C2),sup-ply chain disruption risk scale(S)and the government's proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p).(3)The probability of the industrial association taking charge of guidance(z)is an increasing function of revenue for the industrial association taking charge of guidance(R3),social reputation effect(M),govern-ment support funds(W),the government's proportion of social reputation effect(q),and the enterprise’s proportion of government support funds(β),and a decreasing function of cost for the industrial association taking charge of guidance(C3).(4)The government's strategy choice is greatly influenced by the government's proportion of supply chain disruption risk(p).When p is greater than 80%,the government tends to not take charge of supply chain disruption risk prevention.(5)The industrial association's strategy choice is greatly influenced by the enterprise's proportion of gov-ernment support funds(β).Whenβis higher than 90%,the industry association tends to not take charge of guidance for the purpose of maximizing its own value.Based on the research results,we drew conclusions as follows:the government should actively build high-quality supply chain,strengthen risk management and multi-dimensional coordination;enterprises should make every effort to strengthen supply chain resilience,improve their ability of risk control and manage-ment;industrial associations should provide comprehensive supply chain risk management services and sup-port,and promote talent education and cultivation systems;and the three subjects should collaborate to achieve the ideal decision of each subject.