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央企高管薪酬:现状分析与展望

Salary of Executives in Central Enterprises:Current Situation Analysis and Prospects
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摘要 国有企业由于其经营目标和任务的特殊性,管理人员薪酬契约设置容易产生激励不足或激励扭曲的问题。如何完善高管激励机制一直是国企治理和改革关注的重点。本文以中央企业(以下简称“央企”)公开披露的高管薪酬数据为基础,分析央企高管薪酬福利的现实水平、组成结构及变化趋势,讨论优化国企高管薪酬契约、提升激励效能的方法途径。从央企高管薪酬的整体走势来看,平均薪酬水平稳中有升,但涨幅有限,薪酬构成相对稳定。根据央企高管薪酬分配的现状,本文进一步提出,通过契约条款强化薪酬绩效关联性,创新长期激励要素,合理配置薪酬组成结构,根据国企功能属性和定位,差异化薪酬契约中的业绩目标和考核方式,有助于实现薪酬激励效果和组织绩效的整体提升。本文的研究为更好地理解国有企业薪酬激励问题、改善薪酬契约、优化激励效能提供了客观的现实依据和有价值的参考思路。 Due to the specificity of their business goals and tasks,State-owned enterprises are prone to insufficient and distorted incentives in the setting of compensation contracts for management personnel.How to improve the incentive mechanism for executives has always been the focus of attention in the governance and reform of state-owned enterprises.Based on the publicly disclosed executive compensation data of central enterprises,this paper analyzes the current level,composition structure,and trend of changes in executive compensation and benefits of central enterprises,and discusses methods and approaches to optimize executive compensation contracts and improve incentive efficiency in state-owned enterprises.From the overall trend of executive compensation in central enterprises,the average salary level has remained stable with some increase,but the increase is limited,and the salary composition is relatively stable.Based on the current situation of salary distribution for executives in state-owned enterprises,this article further proposes to strengthen the correlation between salary and performance through contract terms,innovate long-term incentive elements,allocate reasonably the salary composition structure,and differentiate the performance goals and assessment methods in salary contracts according to the functional attributes and positioning of state-owned enterprises,which will help achieve the overall improvement of salary incentive effects and organizational performance.This study provides objective practical basis and valuable references for a better understanding of the issue of incentives in stateowned enterprises,improving salary contracts,and optimizing incentive effectiveness.
作者 夏怡斐 阴慧芳 Xia Yifei;Yin Huifang
出处 《管理会计研究》 2024年第4期70-81,共12页 MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING STUDIES
基金 国家自然科学基金(72372097) 温州肯恩大学校级科研项目Internal Faculty Research Support Program(IRSPK202203)的资助。
关键词 高管薪酬激励 薪酬绩效敏感度 薪酬结构 薪酬管制 Top Executive Incentives Salary Performance Sensitivity Salary Structure Salary Control
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