商业银行“绩效追索扣回”合理吗?——基于招商银行和民生银行的对比研究

Is the"Performance Clawback"Mechanism in Commercial Banks Justifiable?:A Comparative Study of China Merchants Bank and China Minsheng Bank

防范化解重大金融风险客观要求商业银行要在内部治理建立一套长效的、激励与风险相容的薪酬机制,因此建立“绩效追索扣回”制度成为必然。然而,近年来商业银行向员工追索扣回绩效薪酬的事件时常引爆舆论,市场颇为疑惑绩效追索扣回是否代表了商业银行内部“风险激增”。本文通过分析舆情热度,综合对比分析招商银行和民生银行的一系列财务指标,排除了“绩效追索扣回”的风险激增假说,即该制度并不代表商业银行资产负债表存在风险增大趋势。相反,银行推出“绩效追索扣回”后,其不良贷款率明显降低,员工的业绩薪酬敏感性下降,股价崩盘风险降低,说明“绩效追索扣回”是银行完善薪酬制度、促进可持续发展、防范化解重大金融风险的必然结果。

The objective requirement of preventing and resolving significant financial risks is to establish a long-term incentive and risk-compatible compensation mechanism for internal governance in commercial banks.Therefore,it is inevitable to establish a"performance clawback"system.However,in recent years,incidents of commercial banks recouping performance compensation from employees have occasionally sparked public opinion,and the market is quite skeptical about whether reverse recoupment of compensation from employees represents"a sharp increase in risk"within commercial banks.By analyzing the intensity of public opinion and comprehensively comparing a series of financial indicators between China Merchants Bank and China Minsheng Bank,we first ruled out the hypothesis of a sharp increase in risk due to performance clawback,which means this system does not represent an increasing trend in the risk of commercial banks'balance sheets.On the contrary,after the introduction of performance clawback mechanism,the bank's non-performing loan ratio decreased significantly,employee performance compensation sensitivity increased,and the risk of stock price collapse decreased.This indicates that performance clawback is an inevitable result of the bank's aim to improve the bank's compensation system,promote sustainable development,and prevent and resolve major financial risks.