河北省钢铁产业绿色低碳转型的机制与路径——基于双碳背景与动态博弈模型的分析

Mechanism and path of green and low-carbon transformation of iron and steel industry in Hebei Province:analysis based on the two-carbon background and dynamic game model

绿色低碳转型是双碳背景下钢铁企业实现可持续发展的关键战略,当前钢铁企业绿色低碳转型的机制与路径研究尚处于摸索阶段。通过CEADS数据库进行数据收集,基于完全信息动态博弈理论,构建政府与钢铁企业的演化博弈模型,获取双方在不同情形下的稳定策略和演化路径,并选用Matlab软件对政府与钢铁企业的动态博弈过程进行仿真分析。结果表明,政府在钢铁企业低碳生产过程中的监管成本以及企业自身在低碳技术的创新与研发过程中的投入成本取值变化会影响系统的稳定状态;企业低碳生产时基本收益、低碳生产时收获的额外收益、高碳生产时获得的额外收益、政府的补助与罚款都会对系统演化结果产生影响。最后,从政府和企业两方面提出河北省钢铁产业绿色低碳转型的对策建议。

Green and low-carbon transformation is a key strategy for steel enterprises to achieve sustainable development under the dual carbon background.Currently,research on the mechanism and path of green and low-carbon transformation in steel enterprises is still in the exploratory stage.Data collection was conducted through the CEADS database,and based on the complete information dynamic game theory,an evolutionary game model between the government and steel enterprises was constructed to obtain stable strategies and evolutionary paths of both parties in different situations.MATLAB software was used to simulate and analyze the dynamic game process between the government and steel enterprises.The results indicate that the regulatory costs of the government in the low-carbon production process of steel enterprises and the changes in the investment costs of enterprises in the innovation and research and development of low-carbon technologies will affect the stability of the system.The basic benefits of low-carbon production for enterprises,the additional benefits obtained during low-carbon production,and the additional benefits obtained during high carbon production,as well as government subsidies and fines,will all have an impact on the results of system evolution.Finally,propose countermeasures and suggestions for the green and low-carbon transformation of the steel industry in Hebei Province from both the government and enterprises.