摘要
差错责任追究制度在公司内部治理中占据重要地位,然而其可能产生的非预期效应却常被忽视。基于股价同步性独特视角,利用2007-2022年间A股上市公司的数据,深入探讨了这一问题,并通过构建双重差分(DID)模型,精确分析了差错责任追究制度对股价同步性的影响。研究结果显示,实施该制度后,公司的股价同步性显著提升,尤其是在那些应计盈余管理减少但真实盈余管理增加,以及年报可读性降低的公司中,这一效应更为显著。进一步研究发现,管理层持股较少、分析师跟踪较少的公司,受该制度的影响更为明显。此外,股价同步性的提高导致了公司权益资本成本的增加和投资者信心的降低。研究揭示了差错责任追究制度可能引发管理层盈余管理和信息披露的策略性行为,从而降低股票定价效率。代理冲突和外部监督的缺失是诱导这些非预期效应的关键因素。研究结果不仅深化了对公司内部治理机制非预期效应的理解,而且为监管机构制定相关政策提供了重要的参考,以警惕并应对可能的非预期后果。
The accountability system for errors plays a significant role in corporate internal governance,yet its potential unintended consequences are often overlooked.From the unique perspective of stock price synchronicity,this issue is thoroughly explored by using the data from Ashare listed companies from 2007 to 2022.By constructing a difference-in-differences(DID)model,the impact of the error accountability system on stock price synchronicity is precisely analyzed.The research results show that after implementing this system,the stock price synchronicity of companies has increased significantly,especially in companies where accrual earnings management has decreased but real earnings management has increased,and where the readability of annual reports has decreased,this effect is more pronounced.Further research finds that companies with less management shareholding and fewer analyst tracks are more affected by this system.In addition,the increase in stock price synchronicity has led to an increase in the company's cost of equity capital and a decrease in investor confidence.The study reveals that the error accountability system may trigger strategic behavior of management in earnings management and information disclosure,thereby reducing the efficiency of stock pricing.Agency conflicts and the lack of external supervision are key factors in inducing these unintended effects.The research results not only deepen the understanding of the unintended effects of corporate internal governance mechanisms,but also provide an important reference for regulatory authorities on formulating relevant policies,in order to be vigilant and deal with possible unintended consequences.
作者
刘文军
何茜
LIU Wen-jun;HE Qian(College of Economics and Management,Fujian Agriculture and Forestry University,Fuzhou 350002,China;School of Accountancy,Central University of Finance and Economics,Beijing 100081,China)
出处
《现代财经(天津财经大学学报)》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第8期92-108,共17页
Modern Finance and Economics:Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
基金
教育部人文社会科学研究项目(21YJC630085)
福建农林大学科技创新专项基金项目(KFb22107XA)。
关键词
差错责任追究制度
股价同步性
盈余管理
年报可读性
the accountability system for errors
stock price synchronicity
earnings management
readability of annual report