无实际控制人与盈余价值相关性

Non-actual Controllers and the Value Relevance of Earnings

随着我国多层次资本市场体系的基本成型,股权结构逐渐多元化,无实际控制人现象在证券市场逐渐增多,备受广大投资者关注。无实际控制人引发公司治理模式重构,对企业盈余价值相关性产生何种影响呢?本文以2007—2021年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为研究对象,检验无实际控制人对盈余价值相关性的影响。研究发现,无实际控制人能够显著降低盈余价值相关性。机制检验表明,企业处于无实际控制人状态增加了企业代理成本、盈余操纵及经营风险,从而降低了盈余价值相关性。高管越轨式冒险行为增强了无实际控制人对盈余价值相关性的负面影响。相较于存在控股股东的无实际控制人而言,无控股股东的无实际控制人降低了盈余价值相关性。无实际控制人状态下,前十大股东存在强势关联关系导致企业盈余价值相关性下降,前三大、前五大股东中国有股权参股能够提升盈余价值相关性。本文的研究结论为改善无实际控制人企业盈余信息质量提供了经验证据,同时为完善现代化企业制度,防范无实际控制人治理风险提供了重要启示。

The actual controller,a“key minority”in listed companies,plays a crucial role in improving the level of corporate governance and enhancing the quality of listed companies.With the basic establishment of China’s multi-level capital market,corporate ownership structure has become increasingly diversified,and the emergence of companies without actual controllers has attracted significant attention from investors.This phenomenon is more common in developed western capital markets,where listed companies typically exhibit highly dispersed ownership structures.To a certain extent,the growing number of Chinese companies without actual controllers is a natural phenomenon in the process of the capital market’s transition from the“emerging and switching”stage to the mature market.Companies without an actual controller exhibit different forms,including absolutely dispersed equity type,relatively dispersed equity type,shareholder balance type,and upper-level shareholders without actual controller type.The non-actual controllers lead to the restructuring of corporate governance models,which exerts a certain impact on corporate behavior.Based on the above considerations,what impact do non-actual controllers have on the value relevance of earnings?Based on the perspective of corporate value relevance,this paper chooses the China’s A-share non-financial listed companies from 2007 to 2021 as samples to examines the impact of non-actual controllers on value relevance of earnings.The research findings indicate that the net earnings of non-actual controllers companies have less value relevance than that of companies with actual controllers.The mechanism test shows that the non-actual controllers increase agency problems between shareholders and executives as well as raise operating risks,thereby reducing the relevance of earnings value.Senior executives’deviant risk-taking behavior significantly enhances the negative impact of having non-actual controllers on the value relevance.The net earnings of non-actual controllers without controlling shareholders is lower than that of non-actual controllers with controlling shareholders.The top ten shareholders have affiliated relation in the non-actual controllers,which provides convenient conditions for their hidden interests and motives,leading to a decrease value relevance.The participation of state-owned equity in the top three and top five shareholders without actual controllers can improve the value relevance of earnings.The above research conclusions indicate that companies with non-actual controllers currently face significant governance risks,which worsen the quality of earnings information.The non-actual controllers pose serious challenges to the monitoring and supervision of China’s listed companies.Based on the research conclusions,this paper provides important implications for improving the modern enterprise system with Chinese characteristics and preventing the governance risks without actual controllers.Firstly,this paper provides a theoretical basis for strengthening the effective supervision of the capital and promoting the healthy development of the capital market.We find that companies without actual controllers tend to have lower value relevance,highlighting the necessity for regulatory authorities to pay attention to such companies in China.Considering that the companies without actual controllers are more susceptible to“Barbaric Invasion”of capital and are more likely to become shells driven by capital interests,regulatory authorities should strengthen effective supervision of such companies,regulate and guide all kinds of capital,as well as provide guarantees for improving the quality of accounting information and achieving high-quality development of listed companies.Additionally,the findings can help external investors gain a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of non-actual controller,enabling them to fully recognize both the governance advantages and governance risks associated with such entities from a micro perspective of financial behavior.This paper provides strong support for safeguarding the interests of external investors and achieving high-quality development in capital markets.