中国农村信贷担保制度下农地经营权“抵押无用论”的再检视

The Re-Examination of the“Mortgage Ineffectiveness Theory”in China’s Rural Credit Guarantee System with Respect to the Right to Operate Farmland

以中国农村信贷担保制度扩容为背景解读农地经营权克服事前信息不对称与缓释事后道德风险的机制与效用。文章采用2004—2019年某农村商业银行发放给72649个借款人的161020条涉农信贷数据,从信用风险与违约策略两个角度检验中国农地经营权的担保效用。研究表明:事前,资产弱流动性及债权难以得到强保护的欠发达信贷市场特征削弱了事前风险理论的强假设,不足以支撑农地经营权发挥信号传递机制,无法普遍降低风险定价。机制分析表明:农地经营权抵押彰显的事后激励约束效用虽不及信用互保与强流动性资产,但优于无担保或弱流动性资产。农地经营权“抵押无用论”有失偏颇,有必要提升担保物权向债权转化后的执行力,改善农地经营权发挥事前筛选机制的制度环境,助推中国农村信贷市场风险管理由风险控制向风险识别转变。

This paper examines the mechanism and effectiveness of the right to operate farmland in overcoming information asymmetry and mitigating ex post moral hazard within the framework of China’s rural credit guarantee system expansion.The study uses 161,020 loan records issued to 72,649 borrowers from a rural commercial bank from 2004 to 2019 to test the guarantee effectiveness of China’s farmland operating rights from the perspectives of credit risk and default strategies.The study finds that:in the underdeveloped credit market with weak asset liquidity and weak protection of creditor rights,the strong assumption of the ex ante risk theory is weakened,making it insufficient to support the signaling mechanism of farmland operating rights and unable to generally lower the risk pricing.The analysis of mechanisms shows that the ex post incentive and constraint effects of farmland operating rights mortgage are superior to those of credit mutual guarantee and highly liquid assets,but inferior to those of unsecured loans or weakly liquid assets.The“mortgage ineffectiveness theory”of farmland operating rights is misguided,and it is necessary to enhance the execution of the legal right to enforce mortgages and create an institutional environment that enables farmland operating rights to play a role in ex ante screening mechanisms,thereby driving China’s rural credit market risk management from risk control to risk identification.