压力回应、利益冲突与国际制度创建的“吸睛”逻辑

Pressure Response,Interest Conflicts and the“Attention-Grabbing”Logic of International Institutional Creation

国家为什么要创建不足以实现其预期效果的弱国际制度?由于既有制度创建理论无法解释这一问题,文章提出了制度创建的“吸睛”逻辑。当面临与国内主要利益集团利益相悖的规范性压力时,国家可以通过创建弱制度来分散国际、国内公众的注意力,让其误以为诉求正在被回应,从而在不损害自身利益的前提下缓解短期面临的规范性压力,并只需承担较小的物质成本。通过美国在2005年主导创建的亚太清洁发展与气候伙伴关系与欧盟主导创设《京都议定书》这两个案例,文章验证了上述理论。研究表明,相较于欧盟与《京都议定书》的关系,美国创建亚太清洁发展与气候伙伴关系并非为了推动全球气候治理,而是为了缓解国内日益增长的规范性压力所进行的“吸睛”之举。这一逻辑不仅丰富了既有制度创建理论,也有助于我们反思当下国际制度低效甚至消亡背后的深层原因。

Why do states create weak international institutions that are insufficient to achieve their intended goals?As existing theories of institutional creation cannot explain this phenomenon,this paper proposes the"attention-grabbing"logic of institutional creation to fill this gap.When faced with normative pressure that conflicts with the interests of major domestic interest groups,states can create weak institutions to divert the attention of international and domestic audiences,making them believe that their demands are being addressed.This allows the state to alleviate shortterm normative pressure without compromising its own interests and at a relatively low cost.This article validates this theory through two cases:Asia-Pacific Partnership on Clean Development and Climate(APP)led by the U.S.in 2005,and the Kyoto Protocol led by the EU.The study finds that in comparison with the EU's relationship with the Kyoto Protocol,the US created the Asia-Pacific Partnership not to advance global climate governance but to mitigate increasing domestic normative pressure.This logic not only enriches existing theories of institutional creation but also provides a reflection on the deep-seated reasons behind the inefficiency and death of current international institutions.