摘要
针对实际中储能资源利用率不高等问题,提出一种新能源发电商和储能运营商之间的储能租赁共享模式,其中储能运营商除了租赁部分储能给新能源发电商外,还可利用剩余储能独立参与市场竞争,因而该模式有助于提高储能资源利用率。为了研究该共享模式对电力市场运行的影响,建立了考虑该共享模式的日前电力市场双层博弈模型,其中,上层为储能运营商与多个新能源发电商基于讨价还价博弈理论来确定储能租赁价格的优化模型,下层为新能源发电商、储能运营商与传统发电商作为价格影响者参与日前电力市场竞争的多时段非合作博弈模型。然后采用非线性互补方法将双层博弈模型转化为单层优化问题求解。最后通过算例仿真验证所提出租赁模式的合理性和有效性。
To solve the low utilization problem of energy storage in practice,a leasing-based energy storage sharing mode is proposed for renewable generators and an energy storage operator(ESO).In this mode,the ESO not only leases some energy storage to renewable generators but also independently participates in market competition with surplus capacity for arbitrage,thereby providing opportunities to improve the utilization of energy storage.To study the impacts of the leasing-based energy storage sharing mode on the competition outcomes in the market,a bi-level game model for a day-ahead electricity market is established,considering the leasing-based energy storage sharing mode.Based on bargaining theory,an optimization model is established at the upper level to determine the leasing prices of energy storage between renewable generators and the ESO.In the lower level,a multi-period non-cooperative game model for the day-ahead electricity market is developed,where renewable generators,the ESO,and conventional generators are considered to bid in the market as price-makers.Subsequently,a nonlinear complementarity approach is used to transform the bi-level game model into a single-level optimization problem for a solution.Finally,the reasonableness and effectiveness of the proposed leasing mode are verified through case studies.
作者
王晛
张梓彦
张少华
张圣祺
WANG Xian;ZHANG Ziyan;ZHANG Shaohua;ZHANG Shengqi(School of Mechatronic Engineering and Automation,Shanghai University,Baoshan District,Shanghai 200444,China)
出处
《电网技术》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第8期3269-3277,I0077-I0080,共13页
Power System Technology
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(52107112)。
关键词
新能源发电商
租赁共享储能
电力市场
非合作博弈
讨价还价理论
renewable generator
leasing-based energy storage sharing
electricity market
non-cooperative game
bargaining theory