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自然法与法律实证主义中的休谟问题

Hume's Problem in Natural Law and Legal Positivism
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摘要 从事实判断“是”推导不出价值判断“应该”被称为休谟法则。其后,黑尔将价值判断区分为道德判断和规范判断;米尔恩把事实区分为非设定性事实和设定性事实,认为设定性事实内含规范性;塞尔则进一步将事实判断区分为无情性事实判断和制度性事实判断,提出从制度性事实判断可以推导出评价性和规范性两类价值判断,从而部分完成了从“是”到“应该”的推导。受休谟法则及其演进的影响,自然法和法律实证主义中存在从“应该”到“应该”的模式,从“是”到“是”的模式,从“是”到“应该”模式,以及否定“是”与“应该”的推导。休谟法则的演进,以及自然法与法律实证主义对“是”与“应该”的探索揭示:完全独立于人的纯粹事实判断是超验的存在;价值判断是主观性判断,它对判断中可能涉及的客观要素只评价或规范而不描述;存在排除赞许、爱好、评价、接受、规范、命令等主观因素的描述性事实判断,从中推导不出价值判断;存在经实践转化的制度性事实,从中可以推导出价值判断;在实践理性中,事实判断和价值判断并非截然二分,具有可通融性。 That a fact judgment"Being"does not lead to a value judgment"Ought"is called Hume's rule.Later,Hare divided value judgment into moral judgment and normative judgment;Milne then divided facts into non-hypothetical facts and hypothetical facts,and argued that the hypothetical facts contain normativity;Searle further divided fact judgment into brute fact judgment and institutional fact judgment,and proposed that two kinds of value judgment can be derived from institutional fact judgment:evaluative and normative,so as to partially complete the deduction from"Being"to"Ought".Under the influence of Hume's rule and its evolution,there exist a pattern from"Ought"to"Ought",a pattern from"Being"to"Being",a pattern from"Being"to"Ought",and a derivation of negative"Being"and"Ought"in natural law and legal positivism.The evolution of Hume's rule and the exploration of"Being"and"Ought"by natural law and legal positivism reveal the following conclusions:(1)The pure fact judgment completely independent of man is a transcendental existence.(2)A value judgment is a subjective judgment,which only evaluates or normalizes the objective elements that may be involved in the judgment,but does not describe them.(3)There are descriptive fact judgments excluding the subjective factors such as approval,preference,evaluation,acceptance,norm and command,from which value judgments cannot be derived.(4)There are institutional realities transformed by practice,from which value judgments can be derived.(5)In practical reason,fact judgment and value judgment are not completely divided and can be accommodated.
作者 任强 REN Qiang(School of Law,SunYat-Sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)
机构地区 中山大学法学院
出处 《吉首大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2024年第4期18-31,共14页 Journal of Jishou University(Social Sciences)
基金 国家社会科学重大项目(19ZDA024) 中山大学法学理论与法律实践研究中心建设项目(2013WZJD0007)。
关键词 休谟问题 自然法 法律实证主义 道德判断 规范判断 制度性事实 Hume's problem natural law legal positivism moral judgment normative judgment institutional fact
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二级参考文献39

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