算法默示合谋反垄断规制理念的反思与回正

Algorithmic Tacit Collusion and Antitrust Regulation:Rethinking and Re-orientation

算法技术的应用被经济学研究证明能够在缺乏沟通的情况下促成超竞争价格,导致学者呼吁反垄断法的强规制理念,主张通过扩大垄断协议的范畴规制新型算法默示合谋行为。然而,强规制理念混淆了经济学与竞争法概念,误读了合谋结果的中立性,扭曲了算法技术的中立性。默示合谋实际是介于单边行为与垄断协议之间的中间状态,其结果作为一个经济结果,本身具有反垄断法上的中立性,反垄断法的介入需要基于“附加因素”进行考量。算法为默示合谋达成提供了技术条件,但技术具有中立性,算法技术加持下的默示合谋并未突破默示合谋的原有生成机理,也不会当然地产生新的竞争损害。因此,反垄断法不应扩大规制范围以回应算法默示合谋,而应当继续坚持传统框架下的规制思路。

Economic research has demonstrated that algorithms can achieve supra-competitive pricing without communication.Consequently,there have been increasing calls for the adoption of a more stringent regulatory framework within antitrust law to address algorithmic tacit collusion.This proposed regulatory stance,however,tends to blur the distinction between economics and competition law,misinterprets the inherent neutrality of tacit collusion within the realm of antitrust law,and skews the perception of the neutrality of algorithmic technology.Tacit collusion is actually an intermediate state between unilateral conduct and monopoly agreements,and its outcome,viewed as economic phenomena,inherently embody a degree of neutrality under antitrust law,necessitating evaluation based on plus factors.While algorithms provide the technical infrastructure conducive to tacit collusion,the technology itself remains neutral.Algorithmic tacit collusion does not exceed the original mechanism of implied collusion,nor does it necessarily result in new competitive harm.Therefore,antitrust law should not expand its regulatory scope in response to algorithmic tacit collusion,but should continue to adhere to regulatory approaches within the traditional framework.