考虑研发补贴的政企协同创新双向政策调控路径

The Dual Regulatory Paths of Collaborative Innovation between Local Governments and Enterprises from the Perspective of R&D Subsidy

从研发补贴与企业研发投入,研发补贴与企业获得的外部投资两个倒“U”型关系入手,构建地方政府和研发企业间的随机演化博弈模型,通过模型求解与计算机仿真,探讨随机干扰环境下两类主体的策略演化态势。针对地方政府和研发企业,从增强主体选择合作策略的稳定性和提升主体选择合作策略的速度两个政策调控路径着手,分析单变量调控和多变量协同调控的政策效力。结果表明:第一,上级政府在政策协同调控中,存在不同调控路径下的相同最优政策组合,且政策协同效果出现方向性差异,创新协同效应和企业新产品销售收入在两种调控路径中分别起到关键作用;第二,对研发企业的政策协同调控中,如果相关政策配套(即提高企业新产品销售额,降低企业税收税率,提高企业无补贴状态下获得外部投资额和政企创新协同效应),降低研发补贴反而会刺激企业研发的积极性,并减少企业的“背叛”行为。

The R&D process in enterprises is characterized by high risk and uncertainty regarding returns.Governments often establish a series of R&D subsidy programs to encourage enterprise innovation.Currently,countries worldwide have introduced various R&D subsidy programs,such as the EU's"Horizon 2020"and the US's"CHIPS Act."However,there is still ongoing debate in the academic community regarding how R&D subsidies stimulate enterprise innovation investment and help attract external investment.Some scholars have attempted to explain the impact of R&D subsidies at different stages using an"inverted U-shaped"relationship.This approach has provided a new perspective for research.This article takes the"inverted U-shaped"relationship as a starting point to analyze the issue of government-enterprise collaborativeinnovation.This article first establishes the"inverted U-shaped"relationship function between enterprise R&D investment and government R&D subsidies,as well as the"inverted U-shaped"relationship function between enterprise external financing and government R&D subsidies.Based on the analysis of profit and loss variables,an evolutionary game model is constructed.A random disturbance system is introduced to simulate external disturbances during the decision-making evolution process.Additionally,by analyzing the existence and stability of equilibrium solutions,the article solves the conditions for a stable zero-moment equilibrium.With the help of MATLAB software,simulation analysis was conducted on the stochastic evolutionary game model.Regarding the coordinated regulation of local government policies,the article highlights that a policy combination that reduces R&D subsidies,increases enterprise sales of new products,enhances the synergy of government-enterprise innovation,and reduces the probability of enterprises not conducting R&D can produce the most significant positive impact.However,it also reveals that even when each policy is regulated according to the expected direction,directional differences in the synergy effect of multiple policies still occur.Core variables play a crucial role in regulation,such as the role of innovation synergy in enhancing the stability of subject selection for cooperative strategies and the role of government-enterprise innovation synergy and the probability of R&D enterprise betrayal in the regulation path of increasing the speed of subject selection for cooperative strategies.For different regulation paths,the same variable combination for coordinated regulation can also lead to differences.Regarding the coordinated regulation of R&D enterprise policies,the article suggests that multi-policy coordination has a better regulatory effect on enterprises compared to regulation by local governments.Under the premise of relevant policy support,reducing R&D subsidies can stimulate enterprise R&D enthusiasm and reduce enterprise"betrayal"behavior.Additionally,when promoting rapid participation of enterprises in innovation cooperation,higher-level governments need to prevent redundant situations caused by policy issuance.On this basis,the article proposes some policy recommendations.When higher-level governments regulate local governments,they can appropriately encourage local governments to reduce R&D subsidies to ease financial pressure.However,at the same time,relevant measures should be introduced to increase enterprise sales revenue of new products,improve the performance of government-enterprise cooperation in innovation,and enhance enterprise enthusiasm for R&D.Higher-level governments also need to be vigilant about the negative effects brought about by some policy coordination regulations.The most typical example is the situation where"reducing subsidies"and"reducing taxes"are hastily promoted without other policy measures being introduced.If higher-level governments pursue regulatory stability,they should focus on improving the performance of government-enterprise cooperation in innovation,encourage enterprises to apply for local R&D subsidy projects,and carry out R&D activities around the needs of local industrial development.However,if the focus is on promoting the speed of government-enterprise innovation cooperation,then the most important thing is to intensify the substantive R&D review for R&D enterprises after they receive subsidies.In addition,local governments often tend to subsidize short-term and high-visibility product development projects.Therefore,when subsidizing,higher-level governments should focus on long-term basic research and applied research projects,providing effective supplements to local governments.When higher-level governments regulate R&D enterprises,if the reduction of R&D subsidy levels is intended to reduce financial pressure,a series of measures should be introduced to increase enterprise sales revenue of new products,such as increasing subsidies for new products and reducing taxes.This will,in turn,stimulate enterprise R&D enthusiasm.Furthermore,if higher-level governments have already introduced relevant policies related to new product sales,government-enterprise cooperation,and enterprise R&D enthusiasm,there is no need to introduce other policy measures.When applying for local government subsidy projects,enterprises should focus on the effectiveness of project results,and the projects should be closer to the market end.