摘要
利用股权质押新规这一准自然实验,使用双重差分模型研究监管新规对股权质押公司投资效率的影响。基于2015—2022年A股上市公司的实证研究表明:监管新规显著抑制大股东股权质押后的过度投资和投资不足,对非效率投资发挥显著抑制作用;机制分析显示,监管新规引起上市公司股权质押比例下降、盈余管理减少,由此弱化两权分离及信息不对称,减少公司非效率投资;异质性分析表明,监管规则变化对抑制非国有企业非效率投资作用更为显著。据此,监管部门应继续加强股权质押行为监管,限制高比例质押和连续质押;强化信息披露监管,重视发挥独立审计机构作用;质权人也应加强股权质押业务事前调查与事后监督。
Using the quasi-natural experiment of the new rules of equity pledge,a difference-in-differences model is used to study the impact of the new regulation on the investment efficiency of equity pledge companies.Based on the empirical analysis of A-share listed companies from 2015 to 2022,the study shows that the new regulations significantly inhibit over-investment and under-investment following equity pledge by major shareholders,and have a significant inhibitory effect on the inefficient investment.Mechanism analysis shows that the new regulations cause the decline of the proportion of equity pledge of listed companies and the reduction of earnings management,thus weakening the separation of the two rights and information asymmetry,and reducing the inefficient investment of companies.The heterogeneity analysis shows that the change of regulatory rules has a more significant effect on inhibiting inefficient investment of non-state-owned enterprises.Accordingly,the regulatory authorities should continue to strengthen the supervision of equity pledge,limit the high proportion of pledge and continuous pledge,strengthen the supervision of information disclosure,and attach importance to the role of independent audit institutions.The pledgees should also strengthen the pre-investigation and post-supervision of the equity pledge business.
出处
《企业经济》
北大核心
2024年第8期28-39,共12页
Enterprise Economy
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“股权质押上市公司非效率投资风险及防控对策研究”(项目编号:19BJY245)。
关键词
监管新规
股权质押
投资效率
new regulatory rules
equity pledge
investment efficiency