质询互动中的隐性人际冲突缓和及关系管理

Mitigation of Implicit Conflicts and Rapport Management in Assertive Questioning Interactions

针对上市企业财务质询互动中隐瞒或回避的财务信息,财务分析师与企业高管展开质询与答复,其机构、职业等固有属性导致的立场对立常引发隐性人际冲突。本文基于5家上市企业的财务质询互动语料,以和谐管理理论为视角,研究财务分析师与企业高管如何缓和隐性冲突并实现与对方及作为旁听者的股票投资人的关系管理。研究发现,财务质询互动中交际双方常用态度缓和、延迟、信息模糊化和立场合理化4类缓和策略。财务分析师通过缓和策略提升与企业高管、股票投资人的关系;企业高管通过缓和策略推进关系型互动目标、破坏事务型互动目标,因而表面提升实则破坏与财务分析师及股票投资人的关系。

To address the concealed or evaded financial information in the company executives'presentations,financial analysts engage in assertive questioning to elicit executives'responses.The inherent attributes of this interaction,such as institutional contexts and participants'professions,their opposing stances often cause implicit interpersonal conflicts.Based on a dataset of assertive questioning interactions of five listed companies,adopting Rapport Management Theory,this paper examines how financial analysts and company executives mitigate implicit conflicts and achieve rapport management with each other and stock investors as listeners.The study finds that attitude softening,disagreement delaying,obfuscating,and rationalizing are common mitigation strategies employed in such interactions.Through these strategies,financial analysts strengthen their rapport with both company executives and stock investors.In contrast,company executives enhance relational goals and undermine transactional goals simultaneously,thus presenting an ostensible enhancement but actually causing a disruption in their rapport with financial analysts and stock investors.