竞争联合演进:横向组织动态均衡研究

Evolution of Competition and Cooperation:Study on the Dynamic Equilibrium of Horizontal Organizations

由于新制度学派的组织研究忽视了横向组织形式问题,止步于比较静态方法,缺乏收益绩效标准及激励机制评价,因而尚未构建出关于竞争联合演进的原理模型。本文从横向关系分化角度,运用动态均衡分析方法,基于二元组织绩效评价标准,提出一个新的横向组织动态均衡的原理模型。通过基本原理分析和数理模型论证,得到并提出三个研究假设:横向关系分化与均衡点分工收益一般为负相关;横向关系分化与均衡点交易费用一般为正相关;均衡点净收益与均衡点一体化为负相关。对两个行业企业样本数据进行实证检验的结果都支持了如上三个研究假设。研究结论如下:第一,横向组织具有两重经济性,第一重经济性指数量互补下的规模效率和对齐难度、结构互补下的配置效率和对齐难度;第二重经济性指选择激励方式以实现互补效率的程度和选择对齐方式以控制对齐难度的程度。第二,当横向分工深化、横向关系分化时,差异互补和替代增多,同质互补和替代减少,互补效率的种类和来源增多,契约体系复杂性及机会主义倾向性增强,互补效率及相应分工收益因潜力空间制约而减速增长,对齐难度及相应交易费用因因素叠加和交织而加速增长,一般情况下横向组织趋向一体化。第三,均衡点净收益与均衡点一体化水平负相关。一般情况下,横向关系分化与均衡点分工收益负相关,与均衡点交易费用正相关。第四,建立了组织横向一体化指标,即“少数股东权益/所有者权益”。建议在竞争联合中把握横向分工深化的机遇,优化产业政策,应用先进技术和变革管理手段,释放互补效率潜力,抑制对齐难度增长,促使盈利能力得到改善。

Due to the neglect of horizontal organizational forms and the limitation to comparative static methods by the new institutional economics school in organizational research,and the lack of benefit performance standards and incentive mechanism evaluation,a principle model of the evolution of competition and cooperation has not yet been developed.This paper proposes a new principle model of dynamic equilibrium in horizontal organizations based on a binary organizational performance evaluation standard,using dynamic equilibrium analysis methods from the perspective of horizontal relationship differentiation.Through analysis of basic principles and mathematical model demonstration,three research hypotheses are proposed:horizontal relationship differentiation is generally negatively correlated with equilibrium point of labor division gains,while positively correlated with equilibrium point transaction costs,and equilibrium point net income is negatively correlated with equilibrium point integration.Empirical tests on data samples from two industry enterprises support the three research hypotheses.The research conclusions are as follows:First,horizontal organizations have dual economies.The first economy refers to scale efficiency and alignment difficulty under quantitative complementarity,and allocation efficiency and alignment difficulty under structural complementarity.The second economy refers to the degree of choosing incentive methods to achieve complementary efficiency and the degree of choosing alignment methods to control alignment difficulty.Second,when horizontal division of labor deepens and horizontal relationships differentiate,differentiated complementarity and substitution increase,while homogeneous complementarity and substitution decrease.The types and sources of complementary efficiency increase,the complexity of the contract system and the tendency of opportunism strengthen.Complementary efficiency and corresponding labor division gains grow at a decelerating rate due to potential space constraints,while alignment difficulty and corresponding transaction costs grow at an accelerating rate due to factor superposition and interweaving.Under general circumstances,horizontal organizations tend towards integration.Third,equilibrium point net income is negatively correlated with equilibrium point integration;generally,horizontal relationship differentiation is negatively correlated with equilibrium point of labor division gains and positively correlated with equilibrium point of transaction costs.Fourth,establish an organizational horizontal integration indicator of"minority equity interests/owners'equity."It is recommended to seize opportunities for deepening horizontal division of labor in competition and cooperation,optimize industrial policies,apply advanced technologies and management reform measures,unlock complementary efficiency potential,suppress the growth of alignment difficulty,and promote profitability.