机器引致与道德责任:基于修正主义的回应

Machine Induction and Moral Responsibility:A Revisionist Response

操纵论证是一种反对相容论的论证,它认为如果在操纵下我们没有道德责任,并且操纵与因果决定之间没有道德责任相关的区别,那么在因果决定下我们没有道德责任。相容论者中有一派“另一行动者视角”主张操纵与因果决定之间有着影响道德责任的区别。但是,这一视角面临着“机器引致”的挑战。现有的两种回应策略要么不能说明这种操纵情形为何不损害道德责任,要么不能解释一些常见的反例而显得不可信。此外,这些以回顾性方法为基础的理论也难以解决道德责任与因果决定之间的冲突。相比之下,我们提出的以前瞻性方法为基础的修正主义理论,既能够克服上述冲突,又能够驳斥“机器引致”,从而支持“另一行动者视角”的主张。

The manipulation argument is an argument against compatibilism,which claims that if we have no responsibility under manipulation,and there is no responsibility-relevant difference between manipulation and the causal determination,then we have no responsibility under the causal determination.Among compatibilism,there is a faction of“the another-agent views”that argues that there is a responsibility-relevant difference between manipulation and the causal determination.However,this view faces the challenge of“machine induction”.The existing two response strategies either cannot account for why this manipulation scenario does not impair moral responsibility,or cannot explain some common counterexamples and appear incredible.Moreover,these theories based on a Backward-Looking approach also have difficulty in resolving the conflict between moral responsibility and the causal determination.In contrast,we propose a revisionist theory based on a Forward-Looking approach,which can overcome the above conflict and rebut machine induction to support“the another-agent views”.