目的论语义学可以解决指称的qua问题吗?

Can Teleosemantics Solve the Qua Problem of Reference?

qua问题指的是,当我们用一个自然类词项去指称一个自然类时,我们认为这一自然类词项指称的就是这个自然类,而不是其他自然类的依据是什么。这一问题对纯粹的因果指称理论构成了批评,表明了因果理论应该容纳描述主义的要素。内安德等人认为,目的论语义学以一种混合主义的立场,通过刻画语义信息传递的机制,能够解决自然类词项在指称上的qua问题。然而,目的论语义学的回答仍然会陷入一些困难,如自然化指称机制中的规范性过于严格、指称选择的过程可能具有任意性以及信息传递的机制可能并非单向的等问题。

The qua problem is about the basis of the belief that when we use a natural kind term to refer to a natural kind,it indeed refers to this natural kind but not to other natural kinds.This problem is the criticism of pure causal theory of reference,indicating that causal theory should incorporate elements of descriptivism.Neander and others argue that teleosemantics,with the stance of hybridism,can address the qua problem of natural kind terms in reference by depicting the mechanism of semantic information transmission.However,teleosemantic solutions still encounter some difficulties,such as the overly strict normativity in the naturalized reference mechanism,the potential arbitrariness in the process of reference selection,and the possibility that the mechanism of information transmission may not be unidirectional.