权力动态配置下的董事会中心主义

Research on the Centralism of the Board of Directors Under the Dynamic Allocation of Power

新《公司法》在公司机关权力配置上偏重董事会,有限地确立了董事会中心主义,但仍存在着以下问题:一方面,对剩余权力的归属规定阙如;另一方面,未有针对性地回应有限公司与股份公司之间的差异化治理需求。对此,应当充分利用《公司法》的留白和任意性规范所营造的规范自治空间,按照“常量经营权+变量剩余权”的董事会权力配置模式,构建适应性品格突出的中国式董事会中心主义。具言之,允许有限公司、非公开发行股份的股份公司等封闭公司的权力中心上移,由董事会向股东会让渡部分经营管理权,以提高决策效率;在以上市公司为典型的公众公司中下沉权力中心,将董事会的部分经营管理权力下放至经理层,构建监督型董事会。这一职权配置模式在耦合“所有权与经营权分离”这一现代公司治理范式的同时,也能够兼顾不同规模公司的治理实际。

The new company law places emphasis on the board of directors in power allocation between shareholders'meetings and boards,establishing a degree of board centralism.However,the new version of board centralism under the new company law still has some shortcomings.On one hand,it fails to thoroughly clarify power division between shareholders'meetings and boards,with residual power attribution absent.On the other hand,it does not address differentiated governance needs between limited companies and joint-stock companies.In this regard,we should make full use of normative autonomy space created by blank and arbitrary norms in company laws while combining characteristics unique to Chinese companies with relatively concentrated equity/shares through“constant management right+variable residual right”mode for board power allocation to build a Chinese-style board centralism that is highly adaptable.This means allowing closed companies such as limited ones or non-public issuance shares to move their power center upward while transferring part of management/operation rights from boards to shareholder meetings for improved decision-making efficiency and reduced agency costs;public listed companies have their power centers sink with boards delegating part of operation/management powers to managers while playing supervisory roles themselves-coupling modern corporate governance paradigms like separation ownership/management rights-providing effective institutional supply for different-sized firms.