摘要
当前,区域间政府债务风险共振已成为防范化解系统性风险的新挑战,巫函须厘清地方政府债务风险的时空溢出效应和机理。本文通过构建数理模型从理论上证明地方政府债务风险的空间关联性,并基于地级市的面板数据,使用静态和动态面板空间杜宾模型开展了实证检验,结果发现:第一,地方政府债务风险具有显著的正向空间溢出效应,邻近地区债务扩张会引发本地债务风险增大;第二,相邻地区当期新增债务上升会驱动本地债务扩张、加剧地方债务风险,但相邻地区存量债务风险则具有参照点效应和风险预警作用,从而降低本地债务风险;第三,从作用边界看,债务风险的空间溢出极限作用范围大致为500公里,且在很大程度上被省际行政边界所阻隔,导致债务风险的空间溢出效应主要体现在同省城市之间;第四,进一步研究发现,地方政府财政支出竞争呈现更强的策略替代型竞争,能够降低区域间政府债务风险溢出效应,但地方政府往往紧町邻近地区的举债行为,在一定程度上减弱了邻近区域的“风险预警”作用。因此,需要进一步优化债务管理体制,落实主体责任,细化风险防控体系,并合理引导地区竞争和地方政府举债行为。
With the deepening of regional economic relations,the spatial spillover effect of local government debt risk has become an urgent problem to be solved.While existing literature has explored the existence of such spillovers and their pathways,research on the scope or limitations of differences in these effects remains limited,especially given local government competition and risk-balancing behaviors.To address this gap,we adopted the perspective of spatial correlation of risk and focused on the debt risk of prefecture-level cities.We discussed the spatial spillover effect and its boundaries,and the role of fiscal expenditure competition in producing that effect and the reference point effect.We found a significant positive spatial spillover effect of local government debt risk,and an increased local government debt risk due to the debt expansion of neighboring regions.From a dynamic point of view,the incremental debt in neighboring regions promotes the growth of local debt,and the stock debt risk serves as a reference point to alleviate local risks.In addition,we found that spatial spillovers were limited geographically at 500 km and hindered to a large extent by provincial administrative boundaries,suggesting significant intra-provincial spillovers.The fiscal expenditure competition among local governments presents a strategic alternative model,which not only reduces the spillover of inter-regional debt risks,but also weakens the risk warning function of neighboring regions.The study makes several key contributions.Firstly,by analyzing the spillover effect of"local debt"(including the interest-bearing debt of financing vehicles),we gained insight into the risk's early warning effect of current debt increment and debt accumulation,which is crucial for policymakers to prevent systemic risks caused by interregional debt resonance.Secondly,in-depth study of the early warning role of debt risks in neighboring regions,and the identification of the extreme distance and administrative boundaries of spillover effects,provides detailed empirical evidence for accurate monitoring of regional risks and for coordinated preventive efforts.Thirdly,different from previous studies,this paper divides local government competition into two types:strategic complementarity and strategic substitution,and clarifies the double-edged role of fiscal expenditure competition in debt risk spillover,promoting orderly competition and differentiated risk management strategies.
作者
吉富星
阮小丫
潘攀
刘兆璋
JI Fuxing;RUAN Xiaoya;PAN Pan;LIU Zhaozhang(University of Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,102488;Sichuan Agricultural University,611130)
出处
《财贸经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2024年第8期52-67,共16页
Finance & Trade Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金项目“网络视角下地方政府融资平台的债务风险传染及治理研究”(23BJY036)
北京社会科学基金项目“有效防范化解财政、金融领域重大风险研究”(23LLYJC124)
中国社会科学院大学重大项目“新时代财政政策效能提升的测度理论、方法与中国实践研究”(20230084)。
关键词
地方政府债务风险
空间溢出效应
参照点效应
作用边界
财政支出
竞争
Local Government Debt Risk
Spatial Spillover Effect
Reference Point Effect
Border of Effect
Fiscal Expenditure Competition