期刊文献+

金融机构提前介入PPP项目的风险管理激励效应研究

Research on the Risk Management Incentive Effect of Financial Institutions'Early Intervention in PPP Projects
原文传递
导出
摘要 金融机构作为PPP项目的主要资金提供方,当项目发生风险时,需要承担巨额的经济损失,却较少地参与项目的风险管理过程,不利于降低风险事件发生的可能性,推动PPP项目的顺利实施。为了提高项目的风险管理水平,减少项目风险事件的发生,本文对金融机构提前介入PPP项目的风险管理激励效应展开了研究。基于委托代理理论,本文分别构建了金融机构提前介入PPP项目规划阶段,并与政府共同成为委托人的双重委托代理模型,以及金融机构不提前介入的单委托代理模型。研究结果显示,金融机构提前介入情境下的双重委托代理模型,可以增强政府的激励强度,提高社会资本方的风险管理努力水平和非风险管理努力水平。另外,政府获得的期望效用水平和金融机构获得的期望效用水平都得到了提高。 As the primary fund provider of PPP projects,financial institutions need to bear substantial economic losses when risks occur in the project.But they rarely participate in the project's risk management process,which is not conducive to reducing the possibility of risk events and promoting the smooth implementation of PPP projects.As many stakeholders as possible should be involved in the risk management process of a project.As essential stakeholders of PPP projects,financial institutions participating in the project's risk management process can not only meet their own needs to reduce risk losses but also increase the experience of project risk management and improve the ability of project risk management.Therefore,the risk management incentive effects of financial institutions'early intervention in PPP projects is studied.Based on the principalagent theory,the dual principal-agent model in which financial institutions intervene in the planning stage of PPP projects early and the single principal-agent model in which financial institutions do not intervene early are constructed.The results show that the dual principal-agent model under the scenario of financial institutions'early intervention can enhance the government's incentive intensity and improve private investors'risk management and non-risk management efforts.In addition,the expected level of utility gained by the government and the expected level of utility gained by financial institutions has been increased.The findings are conducive to mobilizing financial institutions'enthusiasm to participate in PPP projects,rationally plan projects,actively participate in project risk management,and promote the successful implementation of projects.
作者 张晓雪 刘继才 Zhang Xiaoxue;Liu Jicai(School of Civil Engineering and Geomatics,Southwest Petroleum University,Chengdu 610500,China;School of Economics and Management,Southwest Jiaotong University,Chengdu 610031,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2024年第7期54-64,共11页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71571149)。
关键词 PPP项目 金融机构 委托代理 激励机制 PPP project financial institutions principal-agent incentive mechanism
  • 相关文献

参考文献15

二级参考文献168

共引文献334

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部