期刊文献+

双销售渠道闭环供应链的政府补贴模式研究

Research on Government Subsidy Model of Dual-sales Channel Closed-loop Supply Chain
原文传递
导出
摘要 通过对双销售渠道闭环供应链的政府不同补贴模式建立模型,分别研究了政府不补贴情形、政府单独补贴制造商或单独补贴回收商、政府同时补贴制造商和回收商情形下,闭环供应链节点企业的定价和回收率决策。进一步比较了政府不同补贴模式对闭环供应链节点企业决策、消费者剩余和社会福利的影响,从而探讨政府对闭环供应链的最优补贴模式。研究结果表明:(1)为实现消费者剩余和社会福利最大化,政府最优补贴模式为同时补贴制造商和回收商,并按一定比例给二者分配补贴数量;(2)当单位补贴一定时,存在唯一的补贴比例,此时消费者剩余、制造商和零售商利润最大,产品价格均最低,且回收商的利润、废旧产品的回收率均高于政府单独补贴制造商和无政府补贴的情形;(3)当市场规模大于阈值时,政府以任意比例补贴制造商和回收商均可以降低直销渠道的直销价、传统渠道的批发价和零售价,并提高废旧产品的回收率;(4)销售渠道竞争激烈程度的提高及再制造成本优势的增加均有利于废旧产品回收率的提高。 In today’s society,a large number of waste electrical and electronic products increase dramatically.If these waste products cannot be effectively recycled,it will not only bring greater harm to the environment,but also make the production cost of the enterprise high.The Chinese government implements a subsidy policy to encourage the development of the recycling industry.Although the government subsidy policy has a positive effect on the recycling of waste electronic products by enterprises,the government is facing the problem that the subsidy amount cannot make ends meet.How to choose the subsidy object to achieve the optimal benefit of the limited subsidy amount is urgently needed to study.Therefore,a closed-loop supply chain game model with different government subsidies is constructed under dual sales channels composed of a manufacturer,a retailer,and a recycler,and the government’s choice of different subsidy objects on supply chain members’decisions,supply chain members’profits,consumption surplus and the impact of social welfare is analyzed.The correctness of the conclusions is verified through data simulation on the basis of reference to relevant literature and enterprise research.Research shows:(i)the best government subsidy pattern is that simultaneously subsidize manufacturers and collectors,allocate approximately equal subsidies to both manufacturers and collectors,and appropriately implement as many subsidies as possible for unit product when consumer surplus and social welfare are optimal;(ii)there is a unique subsidy ratio that maximizes consumer surplus,manufacturers and retailers profit,and product prices when unit product subsidy is fixed.Moreover,the profit of collectors and the collection rate are higher than the situation where the government subsidizes manufacturers separately and without government subsidies under this ratio;(iii)when the market size is greater than the threshold,the government subsidizing manufacturers and collectors at any ratio can reduce the direct sales price,the wholesale price and retail price,and increase the collection rate;(iv)improving the intensity of competition between dual sales channels and expanding the remanufacturing cost advantageare both beneficial to increase the collection rate.Some management suggestions are provided for the government,manufacturing companies and waste product recycling companies.For the government,it is necessary to comprehensively consider the market scale and recycling scale of the product when choosing subsidies.For manufacturers,it is possible to reduce the cost of product remanufacturing through technological innovation or improved management.For recyclers,they can reduce recycling costs,increase the recycling rate of waste products,and increase recycling profits through technological innovation and narrowing the scope of business operations.
作者 王文宾 刘业 全诗苑 钟罗升 吕佳 Wang Wenbin;Liu Ye;Quan Shiyuan;Zhong Luosheng;Lv Jia(School of Economics and Management,China University of Mining and Technology,Xuzhou 221116,China)
出处 《中国管理科学》 CSCD 北大核心 2024年第7期258-269,共12页 Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金 国家自然科学基金项目(71971210,71701200,71871206)。
关键词 双销售渠道闭环供应链 政府补贴 消费者剩余 社会福利 dual-sales-channel closed-loop supply chain government subsidies consumer surplus social welfare
  • 相关文献

参考文献16

二级参考文献170

  • 1周海云,杜纲,安彤.回收条例约束下双渠道营销闭环供应链的决策与协调[J].北京理工大学学报(社会科学版),2014,16(5):65-70. 被引量:1
  • 2徐滨士,刘世参,史佩京,邢忠,谢建军.汽车发动机再制造效益分析及对循环经济贡献研究[J].中国表面工程,2005,18(1):1-7. 被引量:77
  • 3Guide Jr V D R, Van Wassenhove L N. The evolution of closed-loop supply chain research[J]. Operations Research, 2009, 57(1): 10-18.
  • 4Savaskan R C, Bhattacharya S, Van Wassenhove L N. Closed-loop supply chain models with product remanufacturing[J]. Management Science, 2004, 50(2): 239-252.
  • 5Savaskan R C, Van Wassenhove L N. Reverse channel design: The case of competing retailers[J]. Management Science, 2004, 52(1): 1-4.
  • 6Park S, Keh H T. Modeling hybrid distribution channels: A game-theoretic analysis[J]. Journal of Retailing and Consumer Service, 2003, 10: 155-167.
  • 7Chiang W K, Chhajed D, Hess J D. Direct marketing, indirect profits a strategic analysis of dual-channel supply-chain design[J]. Management Science, 2003, 49(1): 1-20.
  • 8Chan Choi S. Price competition in a channel structure with a common retailer[J]. Marketing Science, 1991, 10(4): 271-296.
  • 9Chan Choi S. Price competition in a duopoly common retailer channel[J]. Journal of Retailer, 1996, 72(2): 117-134.
  • 10Zhao Z. Raising awareness and signaling quality to uninformed consumers: A price advertising model[J]. Marketing Science, 2000, 19(4): 390-396.

共引文献348

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部