摘要
企业采用“跑马占荒”的形式抢占森林资源,造成了资源浪费,不利于国家“双碳”目标的推进.本文以林业碳汇项目股份合作模式的开发为研究对象,考虑项目开发过程中的道德风险和监管部门的监管力度,构建项目开发企业与林农双方的随机微分博弈模型,明确了项目内部自发合作的条件和不同的外部冲击对项目开发的作用机制.研究发现:首先,在监管部门对项目开发企业实施强监管、对林农弱监管时,且林农分得的碳汇收益比例低于项目开发企业的情况下,能够实现项目内部的自发合作,缓解了监管压力.其次,收紧碳配额将有助于提高碳汇价格均值;将更多的行业、企业纳入碳交易范围有助于降低碳汇价格方差.对于林业碳汇项目刚起步的现阶段,若要有效激发项目参与主体的积极性,应以实施紧缩碳配额或实行碳税政策为主,随后逐步将更多的行业纳入其中.最后,越严格的监管环境和越高的碳汇收益分配比例可以促使参与主体在更短的时间内进行策略调整,政府的财政补助不会对策略调整速度产生影响,但是会激励其行为努力水平.
Taking the development of forestry carbon sink projects in shareholding cooperation mode as the research object,this paper focuses on the moral risks in the project development and the supervision strength of the regulatory authorities,constructs a stochastic differential game model between project development enterprises and foresters,and analyzes the conditions of spontaneous cooperation within the project and the mechanism of action of different external shocks on project development.It is found that firstly,in the case that the regulator imposes strong supervision on the project development enterprise and weak supervision on the forest farmer,and the proportion of carbon sink revenue allocation received by the forest farmer is lower than that of the project development enterprise,spontaneous cooperation within the project is formed,which alleviates the pressure of supervision.Second,tightening carbon quota increases the mean value of the price of carbon sinks,while including more industries and enterprises in carbon trading reduces the variance of the price of carbon sinks.To effectively motivate project participants in the initial phase,the implementation of a tight carbon quota or tax policy should take precedence,followed by the gradual inclusion of more industries and enterprises.Finally,the stricter the regulatory environment and the higher the proportion of carbon sink revenue allocation require the participating entities to make strategic adjustments in a shorter period of time,and the financial subsidies from the government do not have an impact on the speed of strategic adjustments,but incentivize the level of their behavioral efforts.
作者
孙睿
何大义
闫晶晶
SUN Rui;HE Dayi;YAN Jingjing(School of Economics and Management,China University of Geosciences(Beijing),Beijing 100083,China)
出处
《系统工程理论与实践》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2024年第7期2273-2292,共20页
Systems Engineering-Theory & Practice
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(42277484,41971258)
中央高校基本科研费优秀教师基金(35832020054)。
关键词
林业碳汇项目开发
监管机制
随机微分博弈
混沌
forestry carbon sink project development
regulatory mechanisms
stochastic differential game
chaos