非效率劳动投资是薪酬激励失效吗?——基于契约参照点效应的证据

Is Inefficient Labor Investment a Failure of Compensation Incentives?--Evidence Based on Contract Reference Point Effect

伴随着我国人口老龄化程度加剧,提高企业劳动投资效率是优化宏观经济要素配置与提升微观企业竞争优势的重要手段。本文采用中国A股上市公司数据,实证检验高管薪酬契约参照点效应对企业劳动投资效率的影响。研究发现,高管薪酬相较于契约参照点的得益越少,企业劳动投资效率越低,且上述影响主要存在于垂直参照点和水平参照点维度。此外,相较于得益区域,高管薪酬契约参照点效应对企业劳动投资效率的影响在损失区域更高。进一步,高管薪酬垂直参照点效应的影响显著高于水平参照点效应。异质性分析表明,相较于劳动投资不足,高管薪酬契约参照点效应更易导致企业劳动投资过度;相较于劳动密集度高的企业,高管薪酬契约参照点效应的影响在劳动密集度低的企业更大。此外,完善的监督机制(分析师关注、企业内部控制)与激励机制(高管晋升预期)能够显著缓解上述影响。本文的结论能够从薪酬契约治理角度为改善企业劳动投资效率提供一定的管理启示。

With the aging of China’s population,improving the efficiency of enterprise labor investment becomes an important means to optimize the allocation of macroeconomic factors and the competitive advantage of micro enterprises.Using the data of China’s A-share listed companies,this paper empirically examines the impact of the reference point effect of executive compensation contract on the efficiency of enterprise labor investment.It is found that the less the executive compensation benefits compared to the contract reference point,the lower the efficiency of enterprise labor investment,and the above effects mainly exist in the vertical reference point and horizontal reference point dimensions.In addition,compared with the benefit area,the reference point effect of executive compensation contract has a higher impact on the labor investment efficiency in the loss area.Furthermore,the vertical reference point effect of executive compensation is significantly higher than the horizontal reference point effect.Heterogeneity analysis shows that the reference point effect of executive compensation contract is more likely to lead to excessive labor investment than insufficient labor investment.Compared with firms with high labor intensity,the impact of the reference point effect of executive compensation contract is greater in firms with low labor intensity.In addition,a sound supervision mechanism(analyst attention,corporate internal control)and incentive mechanism(executive promotion expectation)can significantly alleviate the above effects.The findings of this paper can provide some management enlightenment for improving the efficiency of enterprise labor investment from the perspective of compensation contract governance.