中国法人类学语境中的“权利”概念

Concept of“Rights”in the Context of Legal Anthropology in China

“权利”作为人类生活与行动的凭籍,蕴含着丰富的人类学内涵。西方法人类学与一般法理学的分析框架不适合中国法人类学中“权利”的概念分析。在中国法人类学语境中,“权利”的概念本源可追溯至先秦时期,直到19世纪后期,“权利”才完成了从“日常概念”向“法律概念”的转变。“权利”的概念特征是“双重经验性”,以及基于“双重经验性”形成的“意义多元性”与“意义不确定性”。辨析“习惯权利”与“法定权利”的差异,厘清法律民族志中“权利”概念的新内涵,以整体论的历史、过程和文化三重视角深描“权利”,是找到中国法人类学语境中“权利”概念的“重新理解力”的关键。

As the guiding principle of human life and action,the concept of“right”encompasses rich anthropological implications.The analytical frameworks of Western legal anthropology and general jurisprudence are inadequate for the conceptual analysis of“right”within the context of Chinese legal anthropology.In the realm of Chinese legal anthropology,the origin of the concept of“right”can be traced back to the pre-Qin period,and it was only in the late 19th century that“right”underwent a transformation from an“everyday concept”to a“legal concept”.The defining characteristics of the concept of“right”are its“double empirical nature”and the subsequent“diversity of meanings”and“uncertainty of meanings”that arise from this empirical foundation.To discern the distinctions between“customary right”and“legal right”,to elucidate the new connotations of the concept of“right”in legal ethnographies,and to offer a deep description of“right”from the holistic perspectives of history,process,and culture are pivotal in attaining a“renewed understanding”of the concept of“right”within the context of Chinese legal anthropology.