非金融类上市公司连锁股东对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响研究

Impact of Non-Financial Listed Company’s Chain Shareholders on Senior Executive’s Remuneration Performance Sensitivity

连锁股东同时持有多家企业的股权,从而在企业之间形成了股东关系网络,为企业高管管理能力的发挥提供信息优势和资源优势.以2007—2020年沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本,研究股东关系网络对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的影响.研究表明股东关系网络与高管的薪酬业绩敏感性有显著的正向关系,说明股东关系网络能够提高高管薪酬业绩敏感性.机制研究发现,股东关系网络通过影响会计信息质量,从而影响高管薪酬业绩敏感性.进一步的研究发现,在代理成本较低或市场化水平较低地区的企业,股东关系网络对高管薪酬业绩敏感性的提升作用更加显著.

Chain shareholders hold equity of multiple companies simultaneously and therefore form a shareholder relationship network between enterprises,providing information advantage and resource advantage for the management ability exertion of enterprise senior executives.With the non-financial listed companies on the Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2007 to 2020 as samples,this study investigates the impact of shareholder relationship network on senior executives’remuneration performance sensitivity.The research results show that there exists a significant positive relationship between shareholder relationship network and senior executives’remuneration performance sensitivity,indicating that shareholder relationship network can enhance senior executives’remuneration performance sensitivity.The mechanism research has found that shareholder relationship network affects senior executives’remuneration performance sensitivity by influencing the quality of accounting information.The further research has found that in the enterprises in regions with lower agency costs or lower marketization levels,the shareholder relationship network has a more significant effect on enhancing senior executives’remuneration performance sensitivity.