论对环评告知承诺制的虚假承诺惩罚

On the Punishment of False Promise in EIA Notification Commitment System

行政许可领域的告知承诺制在多地逐步推行,一些地区在建设项目环境影响评价领域也进行了告知承诺制试点。然而,环评行政许可的告知承诺制在试点过程中引发了形式上的行政许可、实质上的备案等问题,与环评制度的预防功能存在一定程度上的逻辑相悖,因此在学界引起很多讨论。与此同时,对于建设单位虚假承诺的惩罚,多数试点地区仅采取撤销行政许可并辅以诚信惩罚的形式,难以对建设单位的虚假承诺行为产生较强的威慑力。本文对虚假承诺的惩罚实施现状进行分析后认为,其在惩罚环节和事中事后监管环节均存在不足,继而结合虚假承诺预期收益模型、最高威慑效果模型、虚假承诺的支出贴现指数模型进行研究,在加大对虚假承诺惩罚严厉程度、降低惩罚成本、降低惩罚贴现率、提升虚假承诺被惩罚概率等方面提出相关完善建议。

The notification and commitment system in the field of administrative licensing has been gradually implemented in many places,and some areas have also carried out pilot projects in the field of environmental impact assessment of construction projects.However,the notification and commitment system of EIA administrative licensing has caused problems such as formal administrative licensing and substantive filing in the pilot process,which is contrary to the logic of the preventive function of the EIA system to a certain extent,so it has caused a lot of discussion in the academic community.At the same time,for the punishment of false promises by construction units,most pilot areas only take the form of revocation of administrative licenses supplemented by good faith punishment,which is difficult to produce a strong deterrent effect on the false promises of construction units.After analyzing the current situation of punishment for false promises,this paper believes that there are shortcomings in the punishment link and the in-process and post-supervision link,and then studies it by combining the expected return model of false promises,the maximum deterrent effect model and the expenditure discount index model of false promises.Some suggestions are put forward to increase the severity of punishment for false promises,reduce the cost of punishment,reduce the discount rate of punishment,and improve the probability of false promises being punished.