国有企业集团内部放权路径研究

Internal Decentralization Path in State‑Owned Business Group

深化国有企业改革是全面深化改革的重要组成部分。本文将国有企业集团内部放权路径分为自上而下和自下而上两种,探讨母公司和子公司面临所在地竞争变化时如何放权。本文以行政审批中心设立为准自然实验,基于2005-2018年中国沪深A股国有控股上市公司及子公司数据,采用双重差分模型实证检验母公司所在地竞争程度和子公司所在地竞争程度对国有企业集团内部放权的影响。研究结果显示:母公司所在地区竞争加剧增加了内部放权,但子公司所在地区竞争加剧的影响不显著,即国有企业集团内部放权路径是自上而下的。这种自上而下的放权受到母公司信息处理过载和母公司信息获取成本的影响,当母公司业务繁忙、母公司市场竞争地位高、兼任人为高管和兼任人有集团外部兼任时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权;当母公司与子公司距离远和子公司规模大时,母公司会增加对子公司的放权。本文揭示了国有企业集团内部自上而下的放权路径,表明在国资监管“放管服”过程中,协调内部放权路径可能是打通改革“最后一公里”和激发国有企业活力的有效措施。

Since the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,the government has always regarded the reform of“streamlining administration,delegating power,and improving services”as the core of deepening comprehensive reforms.State‑owned enterprises(SOEs)are at the forefront of reform and development,making the effective facilitation of internal reforms within SOEs crucial.Studies on the distribution of decision‑making power within SOEs are relatively scarce.This paper divides the pathways of internal decentralization within state‑owned business groups into top‑down and bottom‑up approaches,exploring how parent companies and subsidiaries delegate power in response to competitive changes in their locations.The establishment of administrative approval centers serves as a quasi‑natural experiment.Based on data from state‑owned holding listed companies and their subsidiaries on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2005 to 2018,this study employs a difference‑in‑differences(DID)model to empirically test the impact of the competition at the locations of parent companies and subsidiaries on internal decentralization within state‑owned business groups.The results show that increased competition at the location of the parent company enhances internal decentralization,while the impact of intensified competition at the location of subsidiaries is not significant,indicating a top‑down pathway of internal decentralization.This top‑down delegation is influenced by parent companies’information overload and information acquisition costs.The parent company is more likely to delegate power to subsidiaries when it is busier with business,holds a higher competitive market position,or when its executives hold multiple roles including external appointments.Furthermore,parent companies increase decentralization when they are geographically distant from the subsidiaries or when the subsidiaries are on a large scale.The marginal contributions of this paper are threefold.First,it reveals the“black box”of internal operations during the reform of“streamlining administration,delegating power,and improving services”in state asset supervision.This paper unveils the patterns of decision‑making power distribution between parent companies and subsidiaries within state‑owned business groups.The research findings provide valuable insights for navigating the“last mile”of reforms and invigorating SOEs.Second,it expands research related to internal power distribution within organizations.This paper distinguishes between top‑down and bottom‑up approaches to decentralization and explores optimal decision‑making configurations in competitive environments from the perspective of executive personnel power arrangements,thereby broadening the scope of related research.Third,it enriches research on SOE reforms.Integrating local administrative approval reforms into the internal reforms of SOEs and viewing internal power devolution as an expression of proactive reform by SOEs,this paper enriches research in this field.This paper not only reveals the internal decentralization paths within SOE reforms but also provides empirical evidence for coordinating internal decentralization and regulatory oversight to enhance overall operational efficiency within business groups.