破产程序中待履行合同的继续履行:法理阐释与制度构造

The Assumption of Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy Proceedings:Jurisprudence Interpretation and Institutional Construction

待履行合同的继续履行对于破产企业的营运价值保护至关重要,但也造成了需要适当处理的特别利益冲突。《企业破产法》第十八条之规定对于待履行合同的继续履行进行了严格限制,形成了过度保护合同相对人的利益格局,也未能对其他无担保债权人提供应有的关注。在我国将来相关制度改良中,对于合同相对人的特别保护应仅限于债务人已违约与管理人转让合同两种情形,保护方式包括要求管理人采取违约补救措施与要求履约主体提供未来履行的充分保障。其他无担保债权人也可能因为管理人决策失当而利益受损,法院应当在涉及融资性合同或者在管理人存在利益冲突时,对继续履行的商业合理性进行实质审查。

The assumption of executory contracts is crucial for protecting going-concern value of bankrupt enterprises,but it also creates special conflicts of interest that require appropriate handling.Article 18 of China’s Enterprise Bankruptcy Law imposes strict restrictions on the assumption of executory contracts,creating an overly protective pattern for the interests of contract counterparties and failing to provide due attention to other unsecured creditors.In the future institutional reform of our country,the special protection for contractual counterparties should be limited to two situations:when the debtor has defaulted or when the trustee has assigned the contract.The protection methods include requiring the trustee to take remedial measures for default and requiring the performing party to provide adequate assurance of future performance.Since other unsecured creditors may also suffer from improper decisions by the trustee,the court should conduct substantive reviews of the commercial rationality of continuing to perform in scenarios involving financing contracts or when the trustee faces a conflict of interest.