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考虑渠道竞争的社区团购新零售问题研究

Research on new retailing of community group buying considering channel competition
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摘要 社区团购是新型冠状病毒疫情期新兴的一种新零售方式,而该模式存在滥用团长、低价倾销挤压实体店等扰乱市场和社会的问题。在此背景下,本文建立了涉及社区团购平台、团长、消费者和实体超市的理论模型,利用消费者选择理论、博弈论等方法,研究了社区团购平台在单一渠道市场和竞争渠道市场下选取团长和设置佣金比例的标准,分析了平台在竞争渠道中“恶意定价”策略的危害性,并为如何引导其合理竞争提供了政策指引。本文的研究表明:(1)社区团购平台选取高于特定价值的团长可以获得更高的利润;(2)社区团购的商品合理定价需要能够反映其为消费者所带来的流通便利价值;(3)社区团购平台“恶意定价”的行为是一种“竞争陷阱”,最终对其自身和对竞争者利益均不利,因而合理的政策引导必不可少。本文的研究有助于正确理解社区团购中的各方行为的内在机理,进而引导这一新零售模式在合理的竞争环境中健康规范运行。 Community group buying is an online shopping model emerges in the Internet era and grows on the social network of acquaintances.This model has gained favor from Chinese consumers for its convenience,and its rapid growth has ignited a so-called“groups battle”.With the abundance of capital investment,community group buying platforms are seeking irregular growth.They are fighting to rob some space from physical supermarkets with malicious pricing,which has led to social problems.Based on the game theory,this paper builds a community group buying model that considers both soft skills and physical requirements of the group organizers,so as to help platforms target competent group organizers,set the commissioning right,and promote win-win.The platforms start with releasing information of commodities and incentives to the organizers.Commodities information can be directly forwarded to consumers,and incentive information is private to group organizers,who will decide whether to recommend the commodity and the strength of recommendation according to the information.Consumers will then understand the utilities of commodities and make decisions according to the value and prices,strength of recommendation,and their trust in the organizers.This paper confines the discussion to a scenario where consumers make all consumption through a community group buying platform in the base model part,that is,assuming that there is not any competition in the market but only one community group buying platform.Extension model of the paper adds a competition channel,which is the physical supermarkets,and benchmarking becomes the main pricing tactic of the community group buying platform as it is the main strategy to compete with low prices.First,solve the optimal pricing conditions of the community group buying platform for the sole online channel condition and the competitive channels condition.This paper also defines the conception of“value of group organizers”.Compared with the sole online channel,the group organizer plays a more important role in persuading consumers to switch from physical supermarket to community group buying under the competitive channel,namely,the value of the group organizers is higher than that of the sole online channel in this situation.The analysis reveals that the value of group organizers will affect how community group buying platform and the group organizer negotiate the final commission.Platforms shall choose organizers whose value is greater than 1 as the leadership effects are more influential than the price effects,and it allows the platform to obtain more profits with less commission charges.Meanwhile,the commissioning rates will float around the organizers′optimal profits as the rates are negotiated with organizers at the recruitment of organizers and before pricing of commodities.
作者 王夏阳 陈思琦 郑茵予 WANG Xiayang;CHEN Siqi;ZHENG Yinyu(School of Business,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China;Lingnan College,Sun Yat-sen University,Guangzhou 510275,China)
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2024年第5期104-117,共14页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 教育部人文社会科学研究项目(20YJA630065)。
关键词 社区团购 团长价值 博弈论 恶意竞争陷阱 便利价值 Community group buying Value of the group organizers Game theory Malicious competition trap Value of convenience
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