摘要
在商业特许经营中,特许人对受许人施加价格限制具有一定的反竞争风险。由于特许经营模式与普通商品分销存在较大差异,对这类价格限制适用反垄断法,需要明确三个争议问题:在主体方面,特许人与受许人是追求各自经济利益的独立经营者,不会因为构成“单一经济体”而排除反垄断法的适用;在行为方面,特许经营模式符合“转售”条件,因而特许人对受许人的价格限制可以构成转售价格维持;在效果方面,转售价格维持不属于特许经营的必需限制,故其无法基于附属限制理论而免受反垄断法调整。对于特许经营中的转售价格维持,最直接的规制路径为纵向垄断协议制度,但有些情况下,转售价格维持实际上是受许人或特许人达成横向垄断协议的手段,并可能因特许人的单方强制而构成滥用市场支配地位行为。不管选择何种分析路径,都需要准确识别行为类型,并对该行为的竞争损害和积极效果进行权衡。
In commercial franchising,there is a certain anti-competitive risk when the franchisor imposes price restraints on the franchisee.There are obvious differences between the franchising and the ordinary commodity distribution.To apply the anti-monopoly law to this act,it is necessary to solve three questions at issue.First,the franchisor and the franchisee are independent undertakings pursuing their own economic interests,thus they don’t constitute a single economy entity.Second,franchising meets the conditions of"resale",so the price restraint constitutes resale price maintenance.Third,resale price maintenance is not necessary for franchising,so it cannot be exempted from the anti-monopoly law based on the ancillary restraint doctrine.For resale price maintenance in franchising,the most direct regulatory path is the vertical agreements system.However,in some cases,resale price maintenance is actually a method to reach a horizontal agreement.Furthermore,if the resale price is maintained as a result of unilateral coercion by the franchisor,it is likely to constitute abuse of market dominance.On the basis of a reasonable analytical framework,it is necessary to identify the monopolistic act and weigh the competitive damage and positive effects of this act.
作者
焦海涛
陈辰
Jiao Haitao;Chen Chen
出处
《竞争政策研究》
CSSCI
2024年第4期41-53,共13页
Competition Policy Research
基金
中国政法大学青年教师学术创新团队支持计划(21CXTD08)的研究成果。
关键词
特许经营
转售价格维持
单一经济体
附属限制
价格限制
Franchising
Resale Price Maintenance
Single Economic Entity
Ancillary Restraints
Price Restraints